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The following constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are determinative or of central
importance to this issue on appeal:
• Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-202. 203. 205. 206. 210. 212. and 302.
(Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Sessions).
• These statutes are reproduced in total, included herein in Addendum C.
• Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-32 to 36. (Amended by Chapter 3, 2001, 2004,
2007 and 2008 General Sessions);
• Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5.2. (Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session);
• Utah Code Ann. Sections 30.3.10. (Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General
Session);
• Utah Code Ann. Section 30.3.10.1-4.8. 10. 10.9. (Amended by 2001, 2003, 2005,
2006, and 2008 General Sessions);
• Utah Code Ann. Sections 30.4-3. (Amended by Chapter 257, 1991 General
Session).
• These statutes are reproduced in total, included herein in Addendum E.
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MINNIE LARUE THOMAS
1885 Harvard Avenue
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MLaRueThomas@kinextions.com
801.787.8887
ProSe

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ARNE JOHN JACOBSEN, II
Petitioner and Appellee,
Vb.

\
]

Appellant Brief

j

MINNIE LARUE THOMAS,
Respondent and Appellant

\
]
\
]

Appellate Court No: 20070560-CA
Fourth District Ct. No. 04440279

COMES NOW Minnie LaRue Thomas, Appellant and Respondent, and respectfully
submits this opening brief to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is Appellant's understanding that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. A further
explanation in included herein as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Did the district court err in regards to Utah Annotated Code Title 78B- Chapter 12Sections 202, 203, 205, 206, 302, and Utah Rules of Judicial Procedure Rule 103(b)
when it entered its orders establishing and/or modifying child support (Rulings on
Child Support)?

3

"In determining whether to grant or deny a petition to modify a child support obligation,
the trial court is afforded considerable discretion. See Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, P4,
98 P.3d 1178, cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2005). (The Court of Appeals) grants substantial
deference to the trial court's findings of fact in child support disputes. In reviewing a
modification of child support, (the Court of Appeals) accord(s) "substantial deference to the trial
court's findings" and "will not disturb the [trial] court's actions unless the court exceeded the
limits of its permitted discretion." Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, P4, 98 P.3d 1178,
cert.denied, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2005) (quotations and citations Emitted). "However, (the
Appellate Court) review(s) the [trial] court's decision for correctness to the extent it involves
questions of statutory interpretation." Id. (quotations and citations omitted)." (quoted from
Meerderink v. Meenderink, 2006 UT App 348, Paragraphs 2 and 6, P.landP.3, Case No.
20050466-CA.)

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion with regards to Utah Code - Title 30 Chapter 3 - Sections 32-36, Section 30-3-5.2, Sections 30.3.10, Section 30.3.10.1-4, 8,
10,10.9, and Sections 30.4-3 when it ordered a "temporary" parenting plan without
accepting evidence and/or considering the best interests of the child(ren)?

3.

Did the district court violate the children's rights to have frequent, meaningful, and
continuing access to each parent, and to have their mother actively involved in their
lives?

4.

Did the district court violate the children's and the mother's rights to due process?

In searching applicable case law regarding these issues, juvenile court petitions have the

most history with this Court addressing visitation, custodial, and parental rights issues. "In
reviewing a decision to grant or deny a termination petition, "[w]e will not disturb the juvenile
court's findings and conclusions unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the findgnis as
made or the court has abused its discretion.;" In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, Paragraph6, 991
P.2d 1118 (quoting in re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1998))). ... "Matters of (3) and
78-3a-402(2); statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness."
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997}.'"
"Utah law requires a court to make two distinct findings before terminating a parent-child
relationship. See In r e M l , 965 P.2d [551, 561 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)]. First, the court
must find that "the parent is below some minimum threshold of fitness," such as finding that a
parent is unfit or incompetent based on any of the grounds for termination under sections 78-3a407 of the Utah Code. Id. (citation omitted); ... Second, the court must find that the best interests
and welfare of the child are served by terminating the parents' parental rights. See Utah Code
Ann. Sections 78-3a-406; see also In reJVLL., 965, P2d at 561 n. 13. In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App
329 at Paragraph7 (footnotes omitted).'" (quoted from T.B. v Stafte of Utah October 3, 2002 UT
App 314 Paragraphs 6 and 7, P.2of 5, Case No. 20001022-CA.)
This appeal is from a "Ruling on Child Support" of the Fourth Judicial District Court in
Utah County, State of Utah, originally signed by the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield, before he
retired from the bench, on May 31, 2007. An associated "Order" was filed on June 12, 2007, by
the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, with the handwritten notation, "for " Anthony W. Schofield,
District Court Judge, "based upon his 'Ruling on Child Support' dated 31 May 2007 and not any
ruling of this judge. Judge Schofield retired before he could sign this order. "
The Attorney for Petitioner filed a Notice of Entry of Order on June 19, 2007, stating,

"... .please take notice and be advised that the Order [April 9, 2007 Hearing] in the aboveentitled matter was signed and entered by the Court on the 12 day of June, 2007."
LaRue filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 2, 2007.

STATEMENT OF THE CAS jj:
On May 31, 2007, the Fourth Judicial District Court ruled that LaRue must pay more than
$12,000 in retroactive child support, and established her child support obligation at $299 per
month. LaRue had filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in March of 2007, and the court accepted
extensive evidence to document the bankruptcy at a hearing on April 9, 2007. LaRue's
bankruptcy was due largely to medical disabilities (that have rendered her unable to earn an
income), extensive medical bills, and outstanding legal fees she accrued as a result of continuing
vexatious litigation from her ex-husband, Arne Jacobsen, Petitioner and Appellee, in this matter.
LaRue has suffered from a medical disability since July of 2005. The Fourth Judicial
District Court based its child support ruling, for support beginning in August of 2005, on
imputed income to LaRue that disregarded the extent of LaRue's medical disability, and included
gifts and financial assistance from years prior from her former fiance, without requiring either
party to file worksheets, nor to fully document all sources of income, nor to verify income to
meet the rebuttable guidelines as established in Utah Annotated Code Title 78B, Chapter 12.
Prior to issuing the child support ruling, at a hearing on April 9, 2007, the Fourth Judicial
District Court issued a verbal order from the bench that terminated LaRue's parenting rights
indefinitely, and allowed the Special Master appointed in this case to prohibit all contact between
LaRue and her two children, until an "evaluation" was completed. The district court based its
orders solely on "hearsay" information relayed by the Special Master, the majority of which was
6

communicated to the Special Master second- or third-hand. The Special Master's information
was not required to be legally supported with evidence, nor allowed to be cross-examined. The
district court did not accept information from either side to establish a preponderance of evidence
to overcome the rebuttable presumption for minimum parent time stipulations, did not entertain a
motion to modify the parenting plan, did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding parenting time, and did not order a custody evaluation according to Rule 4-903b.
As noted, LaRue is disabled. She has not been able to wopk, even part-time, since July of
2005. At the time of the hearing in the Fourth District Court on April 9, 2007, medical doctors
had not been able to pinpoint the cause of- nor a remedy for - LaRue's medical disability.
Nonetheless, LaRue's counsel presented evidence documenting her medical condition, and her
standing diagnoses, to the extent of the medical knowledge and understanding at the time.
During the court hearing, LaRue had an IV line in place for the intravenous injection of
antibiotics and other medications. The PICC line was implanted for almost an entire year, until
March 21, 2008. During that year, the pendency of the subject matter of this appeal, LaRue had
to undergo IV therapy via the PICC line for 2-8 hours every day to manage chronic daily
migraine headaches, and for emergent intervention of minor strokes, or transient ischemic attacks
(TIAs). On March 21, 2008, LaRue suffered a complex migraine that presented with stroke-like
symptoms, thought to be another TIA. After ambulance transport! to LDS Hospital in Salt Lake
City, it was discovered that LaRue had several DVTs (Deep Vein Thromboses), which are blood
clots. To prevent a possible stroke, heart attack, or pulmonary erpbolism from the DVTs, LaRue
is presently injecting Lovenox twice daily and is under home health until she is stabilized on
Coumadin. LaRue submits the medical documentation substantiating the summary of her
medical conditions above, as Addendum B.

HISTORY OF THE CA^E:
1. The parties were married on June 27, 1992 in Glacier National Park, Montana. Two children
were born of this marriage, Jonah John Jacobsen (DOB: 03/2J6/1997) and Savannah Claire
Jacobsen (DOB: 08/10/1998). The parties' final decree of dissolution was signed on May 14,
2001, in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula, MT. Jurisdiction was
transferred to the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court under the auspices of UFISA in early
2005.
2. The parties' original decree in May of 2001 appointed the mother as primary residential
custodial parent until both parties moved to North Carolina, stipulated that both parties and
the children would move to North Carolina for the children to benefit from their extensive
support network there (family and close friends), agreed that both parties were working
professionals, anticipated that the mother would move to North Carolina with the children
"before the end of 2001," allowed that the father would have "up to two years" to move to
North Carolina after he finished cleaning up his "business obligations," agreed to a 50/50
parenting arrangement four months after the father moved to North Carolina, and stipulated
that child support would be reviewed and determined at a later date.
3. The original decree was agreed to by the parties after a 12-hour long Settlement Conference,
and ordered by the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court twb weeks later. It soon became
obvious that the father, Arne Jacobsen, never intended to move to North Carolina. Instead, in
November of 2001, he moved to Park City, Utah, purportedly to work for one of the
companies owned by his brother, Eric Jacobsen.
4. Arne Jacobsen threatened LaRue that he would "burn every penny" she had in the courts, and
take the children from her. He began making good on his threat literally one week after the
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Montana District Judge signed the divorce decree, by filing Contempt of Court motions, and
continuing litigious pleadings in the Montana court.
5. In October of 2002, the Montana Court revised the Parenting! Plan, placing the children with
their father as primary residential parent in Park City. UT. Np court order was issued
regarding child support. LaRue appealed the Order to the Montana Supreme Court, with
counsel arguing, among other issues, that the district court erred in not allowing counsel to
call the Guardian Ad Litem as a witness, nor to examine the Evidence the GAL submitted to
the court. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the district court had committed error
in that regard, but that it was "harmless error," and affirmed ijhe district court decision and
modified Parenting Plan.
6. Upon receiving the October 2002 order from the Montana Cpurt, LaRue quit her job in
North Carolina, put her NC home up for sale, and moved to Provo, Utah, so that she could be
near her children, who were four and five years old at the tim^.
7. In December of 2004, the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court entered another Parenting
Plan Order, which restricted the children's contact with their mother. LaRue appealed, with
counsel. No child support issues were addressed. The Parenting Plan of December 2004 had
been recommended by a Utah Special Master, and was adopted in total by the Utah Fourth
Judicial District Court. The Parenting Plan stipulates, among bther issues, that LaRue must
be represented by legal counsel, but does not provide for a method of payment for legal
representation if LaRue is not able to pay.
8. Between the time of the divorce in 2001, and the decision of the Montana Supreme Court on
the appeal, whenever LaRue and the children were on vacation or out-of-state, Arne would
threaten and harass LaRue and the children, verbally, psychologically, and at times
9

physically. LaRue called 911 several times - in Montana, in North Carolina, and in Park
City, Utah. Arne would always leave before the police arrivqd, or would approach the officer
first and claim that it was LaRue that had "physically abused^' him.
9. In August of 2006, the Montana Supreme Court issued its opinion. The Supreme Court found
one of LaRue's arguments to be dispositive, determined the cjistrict court's error to be a
matter of law, and reversed and remanded the matter back to the district court. The Utah
Fourth Judicial District Court accepted the December 2004 Parenting Plan from Montana, yet
to LaRue's knowledge and belief, has refused to address the Reverse and remand of its
adopted December 2004 Parenting Plan that was ordered by the Montana Supreme Court in
August of 2006.
10. After the Montana Supreme Court decision in August of 200f> that was favorable to LaRue's
position, LaRue was the victim of several incidents of harassing and threatening behavior
that she believes were instigated by her ex-husband, Arne Jacobsen.
11. In November of 2006, as LaRue was returning the children to Utah after their scheduled
Thanksgiving holiday in Montana, a breakdown in the fuel system of LaRue's Dodge
Caravan stranded LaRue and the children in Idaho Falls. Jon^h and Savannah pled with their
mother, with police officers, with a hospital crisis worker, and with the Special Master, not to
"make them go back to their father." They stated several times that they were afraid of their
father, and that they were afraid that their father would "mmxfer them." The children told the
professionals charged to protect them that their father "hurt tfyem bad," and that he "yelled at
them every day". A few days later, Jonah and Savannah told $ DCFS investigator that they
saw their father hurt their mother, and choke their mother until she passed out, when they
were young toddlers and the family lived in Montana.
10

12. This was the first time the children had expressed such horrific fear of their father to LaRue.
Arne was horribly abusive to LaRue prior to the divorce. La^ue had foolishly thought that
the children were young enough that they would not be negatively impacted by witnessing
the abuse. LaRue had never spoken to the children about their father's abuse of her.
13. On November 29, 2006, in opposition to the actions of the Guardian Ad Litem, the Special
Master unilaterally terminated LaRue's parenting rights - without talking to LaRue, without
speaking to LaRue's attorney at the time, and without checking with DCFS or the police, and
without reviewing the documentation from the hospital professionals that had worked with
the children.
14. Since November of 2006, and continuing today, the Special faster and Guardian Ad Litem
have systematically moved to keep pertinent information docMmented by the hospital crisis
worker, DCFS, 911 call records, LDS Family Services, and cither verifiable sources away
from the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court.
15. LaRue sought and was granted a Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction against her exhusband, Arne Jacobsen, and his wife, SuAnne Hoffman Jacobsen, in January of 2007.
16. The Special Master and the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court ignored the evidence
presented to them, some of it from DCFS, about Arne's physical abuse of LaRue in front of
the children, Arne's addictions and his violent criminal history, Arne's acts of domestic
violence toward LaRue, Arne's continuing stalking and haras$ment of LaRue since their
divorce, Arne's threats of violence to the children, and Arne'^ explosive anger that causes his
children to fear for their lives when they are in his care. The Special Master stated that the
DCFS reports have no bearing on her decisions regarding the children.
17. The Fourth Judicial District Court issued its orders regarding parenting time and child
11

support in April, May, June and November of 2007.
18. Prior to the ruling and orders signed by the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court in 2007, there
had been no court orders from either Montana or Utah establishing child support.
19. Since the time of the parties' divorce, and specifically during the seven months prior to the
child support ruling, Mr. Jacobsen had manipulated the court system to "burn every penny"
LaRue had - as he had threatened he would do. In the Spring of 2007, not satisfied with the
Utah district court's actions, Arne hired a separate attorney to disparage LaRue before the
Federal Bankruptcy Trustee, in an attempt to have the federal court disallow LaRue's
bankruptcy proceeding. Nonetheless, after much contentious legal maneuvering, mostly
instigated by Mr. Jacobsen, LaRue's bankruptcy was duly discharged on June 14, 2007.
20. In January of 2008, LaRue was informed by the Utah Office of Recovery Services that a
subsequent "order" on the same matter was signed into effect in November of 2007. LaRue
requested the court documents from the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court, and learned that
Judge Davis had, in fact, signed another "Ruling." It is LaRue's understanding that this
second ruling is taken directly from the April 9, 2007 hearing and Judge Schofield's
"Ruling" of May 31, 2007, that form the substance whereby this appeal is taken. The
information from Utah ORS was an overwhelming surprise to LaRue, as a hearing had been
set before the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis in August of 2007. To LaRue's knowledge
and belief, the hearing was cancelled by the court.
21. LaRue is not an attorney, and is not knowledgeable about the proper procedures for setting
court hearings, and for determining what evidence can be heard at which hearing. She has no
legal education, and has been perplexed by the interplay of laws that govern the two rulings
and one order that have been issued in this matter in the past year establishing child support
12

and accessing retroactive child support.
22. It is LaRue's knowledge and belief that Utah statutory code was violated when the Fourth
Judicial District Court established (or modified) child support, did not address jurisdiction
under UFISA, imputed LaRue's income to $50,000 per year, and accessed retroactive child
support based on an "income" of $9,000 per month during the time period that LaRue has
been disabled and unable to work even part time.
23. From LaRue's perspective, the best interests of the two children have been wholly ignored
with the modification of the court-ordered parenting plan, with verbal directives from the
bench, with no respect of Rule 4-903, nor of the statues embodied in Utah Annotated Code
Title 30 Section 3.
24. To date, LaRue has been prohibited from presenting any information regarding the events of
November of 2006, after which LaRue's parenting rights were suspended, and feels this
information is necessary for the district court and other involved parties to best ascertain the
best interests of her two children.
25. LaRue was not allowed the opportunity to present updated medical and financial information
to the Fourth District Court prior to the filing of the "Ruling" by Judge Davis in November of
2007. She was not informed of the November 2007 Ruling until the end of January of 2008.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT!:

ISSUE 1: CHILD SUPPORT
It is LaRue's perspective and belief that Utah statutory code was violated when
the Fourth Judicial District Court established (or modified) child support, did not enter
13

findings of fact to rebut the established child support presumptions, imputed LaRue's
income at $50,000 per year, did not require that the child support worksheets be filed,
unilaterally determined that LaRue could work half-time ^uring the time period that
LaRue has been disabled and unable to work even part time, accessed retroactive child
support based on an "income" of $9,000 per month, did not enter specific findings of fact
to show the evidentiary basis for imputing income to LaRue at such high levels, and did
not address jurisdiction or modification parameters under UFISA.

ISSUE 2: MODIFICATION OF PARENTING PLAN AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
The best interests of the two children have been wholly ignored with the
modification of the court-ordered parenting plan, with th^ termination of LaRue's
parenting rights for six months, with verbal directives from the bench that allowed the
suspension of LaRue's parental rights to continue indefinitely, with the Special Master
Order for an evaluation ignoring procedures stipulated in Rule 4-903, and with the court's
refusal to consider evidence of domestic violence presented to it by the mother.

ISSUES 3 & 4: VIOLATION OF THE CHILDREN'S AND THp MOTHER'S RIGHTS
It is LaRue's perspective and belief that the distript court continues to violate the
children's right to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to their mother, and
to have their mother actively involved in their lives. It is LaRue's belief that the
children's rights and her right to due process have been denied.
ARGUMENT:

ISSUE 1: CHILD SUPPORT
The following constitutional provisions, statutes or rules ^re determinative or of central
importance to this issue on appeal: Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-202, 203, 205, 206, 210,
212, and 302. (Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Sessions). These statutes are reproduced in
total, included herein in Addendum C.
In reviewing case law applicable to this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court are unambiguous in their decisions to afford the trial court considerable discretion in child
support orders. There is significant case law to justify a review of the rulings and order in this
matter. Specifically, "Although we generally review the determir^ation to modify a divorce
decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a conclusion of law,
we review it for correctness. Krambule v. Krambule, 1999 UT App 357 Paragraph 10, 994 P.2d
210 cert denied, 4 P.3rd 1289 (Utah 2000). The Court of Appeals reviews the district court's
decision for correctness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation. Ball v.
Peterson, 912P. 2d 1006, 1009 Utah Ct. App 1996).'
"We review a determination on whether a substantial change of circumstances has been
shown for abuse of discretion." Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App. 378 18 P.3d 509, 511. Our
Standard of Review in divorce proceedings allows us to disturb t^ie action of the trial court only
when the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or the trial court has abused its
discretion or misapplied principles of law/' Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 700, (Utah 1985). Subject
to those limitations, we are free to review both the facts and the law. Openshaw v. Openshaw,
639 P. 2d 177, 178 (1981); Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, (1981).
"Ordinarily we accord the trial court considerable! discretion in adjusting the
financial interests of divorced parties and thus, "the court's actions are entitled to a presumption
15

of validity.'" Hansen v. Hansen, 736, P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987.) However, where the court
has abused its discretion in apportioning those financial responsibilities, we cannot affirm that
determinations. Id. One such abuse we have recognized in this ar^a of law is the failure to enter
specific, detailed findings supporting each of the factors which must be considered when makin a
child support award. With this standard in mind, we analyze the adequacy of the court's findings
in this case. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).'" (quoted from
Appellant Brief of Meerderink v. Meenderink, 2006 UT App 348, Paragraphs 2 and 6,
P.landP.3, Case No. 20050466-CA.)
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #1: Utah Code Ann. Section 78B12-202. Determination of amount of support - Rebuttable guidelines. (1)
(a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order
unless there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the
obligor or oblige or adjustment under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) has been made.
(2) If no court order exists, .... The court determining the amount of prospective support
shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award
may be granted, (emphasis added)
and Rule 103. Child support worksheets.
(a) When filing a child support worksheet required by Utah Code Section 78-45-7.3,
a party shall ....
(b) The court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, final order of
modification, or final decree of paternity until the completed worksheet is filed.
In the instant case, there was no prior court order accessing child support, no substantial
change of circumstance was presented nor acknowledged, no ch^'ld support worksheets were filed
by either party, no requirement of LaRue to file a proposed award of child support, no
adjustment under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) was requested nor accepted, sufficient evidence was
not presented to rebut the guidelines, there were no findings of fact to rebut the guidelines, and
arrearages were assessed in violation of the guidelines described in this chapter.
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief thit the Fourth Judicial District
16

Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-202. Determination of amount of support Rebuttable guidelines with its rulings and order for child support.
Applying the similar standard of review to a child support order as is afforded to Rule 11
Sanctions, " ... [A]ppellate courts can only overturn an award [of attorney fees based on a
finding of bad faith] if the trial court abused its discretion, and it found no such abuse. See
Griffith v. Griffith, 959, P.2d 1015, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ... "We conclude that this
purported factual finding, drafted as it was by counsel for the prevailing party, simply
paraphrasing the language of rule 11, and standing by itself without any detailed factual findings
particularizing its conclusions is insufficiently specific as a mattqr of law to support the
imposition of rule 11 sanctions. ... "We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit
findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230
(Utah 1997). ... 'The trial court's findings and conclusions must feveal the court's reasoning
clearly enough that an appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part
of the trial court's ruling. What we have before us is plainly insufficient for that purpose.' "
(quoted from Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT Supreme Court 78 Paragraphs 8-10 Case No. 981462
in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.)
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #2t Utah Code Ann. Section 78B12-203. Determination of gross income - Imputed income.
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial
proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, ....
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the
17

condition is not of a temporary nature:
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage
In the instant case, the judge did not enter findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for
imputing LaRue's income at $9,000 per month from August 2005 through August 2006, and then
at $50,000 per year, or $2083 per month, from September 2006 to present. Instead, the judge
issued a "ruling", and directed the Petitioner's counsel to compile the findings of fact. The
imputation ignored the work history and earnings over the previous nine years, as verified by
documents from the federal government, and submitted as evidence by LaRue's counsel during
the April 9, 2007 hearing. The judge imputed a greater income, but did not enter specific
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. The judge imputed income even
though LaRue's medical disabilities rendered her physically unable to earn minimum wage, with
evidence presented that this physical disability had affected LaRue for almost two years prior to
the "ruling" issued by the court.
CASE LAW: See Reese v. Reese 1999 UT Supreme Court 75 Paragraphs 11-19,
Case No. 980004 In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief that the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income Imputed income with its rulings and order for child support.
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #3: Utah Code Ann.
Section 78B-12-205. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their adjusted
gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable
(6) If the monthly adjusted gross income of either parent is $649 or less, the tribunal shall
determine the amount of the child support obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child
support may not be less than $30.
and Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-302. Low income table - Obligor parent only.
(1) If a child support order is established or modified on or before December 31, 2007, the
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table in this Subsection (1) shall be used for a modification to that order made on or before
December 31, 2009.
In the instant case, the low income table is applicable. At the hearing on April 9, 2007,
LaRue presented federal income documentation verifying that she received income in 2005 of
$104. LaRue's 2005 IRS Form 1040, included herein in Addendum D, substantiates earned
income of $104, for a total income of $235.00 for 2005. LaRue 41so presented federal income
documentation verifying that she received income in 2006 of $5,^62. LaRue's 2006 IRS Form
1040, included herein in Addendum D, substantiates earned incoifne of $5,262, for a total income
of $5,262.00 for 2006. LaRue's income was clearly less than $650 per month.
The tribunal in this case determined child support should be calculated on an individual
basis, yet violated the rebuttable guidelines, in issuing the "Ruling on Child Support." The
tribunal accepted Petitioner's testimony of earned income, without the prerequisite worksheets or
supporting documentation. The tribunal accepted evidence of financial assistance and other gifts
given to LaRue over a period of years, imputed a "gift" of "rental substitution" as proposed by
Petitioner, and determined LaRue's monthly income for retroactive child support to be $9,000.
As presented in testimony, the large majority of that financial assistance given to LaRue during
the time period in question was to pay for private school tuition for Jonah and Savannah, support
for the children, Special Master fees, and legal fees - which were ordered by the Fourth Judicial
District Court in its adoption of the December 2004 Parenting Plbi. LaRue struggled to pay the
fees ordered by the Special Master in support of the children, such as paying more than $6,940 to
Mr. Jacobsen and for private school tuition, even after the onset of her disability. When other
parties that care about LaRue and the children provided the monetary assistance for basic living
expenses and to pay the fees ordered by the court, the court then counted that financial assistance
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as income - and imputed LaRue's income at $9,000 per month! The court did not include other
income and "gifts" to Petitioner in this one-sided ruling.
CASE LAW: See Johansen v. Johansen, State of Utah, Office of Recovery
Services, 2002 UT App 75 Paragraphs 5,6,12, & 2|7, Case No. 20001127-CA.
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief that the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-12-205. Calculation of obligations and Code Ann.
Section 78B-12-302. Low income table - Obligor parent only with its rulings and order for
child support.

PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #4: Utah Code Ann.
Section 78B-12-210. Application of guidelines - Use of ordered child support.
(1) The guidelines in this chapter apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or
modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumbtion in establishing or
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the
guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the
use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are prqsumed to be correct, unless
rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that
complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from
use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child
in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts
the presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated order.
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if:
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviation from the guidelines;
(b) the guidelines worksheet has:
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and
(ii) an explanation as to the reason
In the instant case, the judge did not enter a written finding or specific finding on the
record that use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of the
child(ren). The qualifications were not met to rebut the presumption for determination of the
amount of child support to be ordered. Neither the rulings nor th^ order included a written
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finding that they are a deviation from the guidelines, nor were guidelines worksheets used
(therefore the box was not checked for a deviation), nor was there an explanation as to the reason
for the deviation from the rebuttable presumptions. Since the child support rulings and order did
not rebut the presumptions through findings, they cannot be considered deviated orders.
"The trial court findings "should be more than cursory statements; they must' " be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary fact to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusions ... was reached.'"" Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,
Paragraph9, 983 P.2d 1103 (quoting Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (other
citation omitted)) ... "Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court's findings fail to
address certain elements necessary to a modification determination, we remand this issue for the
trial court to enter adequate finds, support by appropriate evidenqe. ... "must be accompanied by
sufficient finding regarding the best interests of the children. Because such finding were not
entered in this case, we remand this issue to the trial court for the articulation and entry of
additional finding supporting its order...." (quoted from Diener y. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, P4,
98 P.3d 1178, cert.denied, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2005.)
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief th^t the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section with its rulings and order for child support
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #5) Question of jurisdiction and
appropriate modification of a court order under UFISA parameters.
This case was transferred to Utah, under UFISA parameters, from the state of Montana.
Neither a "registered child support order" was enacted by the State of Montana prior to the
UFISA transfer, nor were the two circumstances allowing a Utah court to modify a "registered
child support order" in place. Accordingly, LaRue questions whether the Fourth Judicial District
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Court had jurisdiction to modify the child support obligations in this case.
In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support order issued by another state if the
Utah court has "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over the spousal support order. Utah Code
Ann. Title 78-45f-206(2) (Spp. 1998). The method by which a Utah court obtains "continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction" over a spousal support order is by "issuing a support order consistent
with the law of this state . . ." Id. Title 78-45f-205(6) (emphasis added). State of Utah,
Department of Human Services, ex rel.; State of Pennsylvania, ex rel.; and Robin E. Kirby v Avi
Alex Jacoby, Case No. 981157-CA filed February 25, 1999._ In the instant case, it appears that
the ruling by the district court was not consistent with the law of this state, nor had the district
court established jurisdiction to make a modification under the oversight of UFISA.
CASE LAW: See Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, Paragraphs 11,12,&18, Case
No. 20030971-CA filed November 18, 2004.
ARGUMENT:
ISSUE 2: MODIFICATION OF PARENTING PLAN, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are determinative or of central
importance to this issue on appeal: Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-32 to 36. (Amended by
Chapter 3, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2008 General Sessions); Utah Cfode Ann. Section 30-3-5.2.
(Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session); Utah Code Ann. Sections 30.3.10. (Amended
by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session); Utah Code Ann. Section 30.3.10.1-4, 8, 10, 10.9.
(Amended by 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008 General Sessions); Utah Code Ann. Sections
30.4-3. (Amended by Chapter 257, 1991 General Session). These statutes are reproduced in total,
included herein in Addendum E.
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PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #1: Utah Code Ann. Section 30-332. Parent-time - Intent - Policy - Definitions.
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all
parties' interests.
(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-t|eing of the child and the parent
who is the victim of domestic or family violence.
(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated
potential harm to the child:
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated
parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following
separation or divorce;
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated pardnt is entitled to and responsible
for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's
best interests; and
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both pardnts actively involved in
parenting the child.
In the instant case, Fourth Judicial District Court allowed and ordered the Special Master
in this case, Sandra N. Dredge, Esq., to prohibit the children, ages 9 and 10, from having any
contact whatsoever with their mother for a period of almost six months - from November of 2006
through May of 2007. The Special Master took this action in December of 2007, in spite of
clear, unambiguous disagreement from one of the psychologists tfhat had been appointed by the
Special Master. In May of 2007, a second court-ordered psychologist recommended that motherchild contact be reinstated for 1-4 hours every week. In spite of this recommendation, the
children's father refused to allow the children's contact with their mother to expand, and through
the Special Master, prohibited the children from any and all contact with their mother for threethree week periods, and then again for two separate periods of t\^o weeks each, during the
ensuing months. During the months of January through March of 2008, the children had contact
with their mother for only 3.5 hours every other Saturday, supervised visitation through
Renaissance Child Visitation Services, in the home their mother bas made for them on Harvard
Avenue in Salt Lake City, for over one and a half years.
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The children are prohibited from telephoning or emailing tiieir mother, in spite of
repeated requests from the children to have contact with their mother. LaRue is not allowed to
visit the children at school, to attend their extra-curricular activities, or to participate in their
school, sporting, musical, or medical activities and events. LaRue feels that the prohibition of her
contact with her children for such an extended period of time doe|s not meet the legislated
standards for the children to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent.
LaRue feels the punitive measures of the Special Master, and vague orders of the court, prohibit
the children from having their mother actively involved in their lives.
There has been no court hearing regarding this matter. Thpre has been no preponderance
of evidence of real harm presented to the court, nor substantiated I potential harm to the child(ren)
alleged. In court hearings convened to address separate matters, guch as child support, the court
has heard only the opinion of the Special Master, yet not allowed any discussion or presentation
of evidence by either side. The children's father, conjointly with the office of the Special Master,
made allegations to DCFS in November of 2006 that the mother had emotionally abused the
children. After an extensive investigation, DCFS determined that the allegations could not be
substantiated. After the DCFS conclusions were in the favor of the mother, the Special Master
stated that the DCFS evaluation had no bearing on her decisions. After several months of
supervised visitation by Renaissance Child Visitation Services, the psychologist in charge, Dr.
Carol Gage, wrote a letter to the Special Master indicating that tlje officials at R.C.V.S. felt it
would be appropriate to allow visitation to be expanded. The Special Master refused, and instead
decreased the amount of time that the children have with their mother under supervised
visitation.
CASE LAW: See M.T.M. v. State of Utah, 2006 UT App 435, Paragraphs 14,17,
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22&23, Case No. 20060225-CA filed October 19, 2006.
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief that the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-32. Parent-time - Intent - Policy - Definitions in
granting authority to the Special Master to terminate LaRue's parpntal rights and substantially
modify parent time over a period of sixteen months without regard to the children's best
interests.
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #2: Utah Code Ann. Section 30-334. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption.
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a
parent-time schedule consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests
of the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to
which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time should be
awarded based upon any of the following criteria: .... (a) - (o) ....
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that:
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule proided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5;
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 303-35 or 30-3-35.5.
and Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce Custody consideration.
(l)(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests of
the child and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the following: ... (i-iv) ...
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, amont qther factors the court finds
relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowind
the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds
appropriate. ...
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate against a
parent due to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining
whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining
whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the
parent wit a disability may rebut any evidence, presumption or inference arising from the
disability by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability
to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources
available to supplement the parent's ability to provide for the {physical and emotional needs of
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the child at issue. ...
In the instant case, no claim, nor evidence, has been presented to the Court, and no
finding has been made by a preponderance of evidence, that the rhother would harm, or has the
potential to harm her children. Three expert witnesses have declared to the Court that the mother
is a competent and capable mother that loves her children, and th^t their clinical observations and
comprehensive testing of the mother indicate that her parental and visitation rights should not be
restricted.
The Special Master has made repeated inferences to LaRue's disabilities, and
misrepresented the impact of those disabilities to the court and to other professionals involved in
this matter. LaRue has not been given the opportunity at any timd to rebut those inferences, as
the court has simply allowed the Special Master to terminate LaRue's parental rights and
suspend LaRue's visitation, without any orders or presentation o^ evidence to object to or to
rebut.
The court issued an order from the bench that purportedly gave the Special Master carte
blanche to suspend LaRue's parental rights indefinitely, and without adherence to any logical
method to remedy the unfortunate situation or set reasonable reunification avenues for LaRue
and for the children. The court did not enter the reasons underlying its order of less parent-time
for LaRue. Throughout this time, no attempt has been made to cqnsider the best interests of
Jonah and Savannah.
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief th^t the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-34. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption and
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce Custody consideration in its verbal order allowing the Special Master to prohibit Jonah's and
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Savannah's contact with their mother, without any checks or balances or attempts to abide by
Utah statutory code.
CASE LAW
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #3: Violation of the Code of
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations.
In its Memorandum to Judges, Commissioners, Attorneys^ and Custody Evaluators dated
March 31, 2003 the Administrative Office of the Courts stated, "Noting that custody
evaluations are of varying quality, that high quality evaluations eta be costly, and that waiting
for evaluations stalls the legal process, the Judicial Council ... presents substantial revisions to
Rule 4-903, "Custody Evaluations." Rule 4-903, included herein with the Memorandum
outlining the custody evaluation procedure as Addendum F, was invoked by the Special Master
on December 1, 2006, when the Special Master first appointed Df. Jay Jensen, of ACAFS in
Provo, Utah, to conduct an evaluation of custodial and visitation matters in this case.
Section (5) of Rule 4-903 states, 'The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to
provide the court with information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting
time arrangements that are in the child's best interest. This is accomplished by assessing the
prospective custodian's capacity to parent, the developmental, emotional, and physical needs of
the child, and the fit between each prospective custodian and chi|d. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, evaluators must consider and respond to each of the following factors: ....
LaRue's custody of and visitation with her children were (suspended pending a custody
evaluation, that was first ordered by the Special Master on December 1, 2006. None of the
requirements of Rule 4-903 regarding "anticipated dates of commencement and completion of
the evaluation and the estimated cost of the evaluation" were included in the court's order for the
evaluation. Over a year later, the evaluation is not completed, and Rule 4-903 continues to be
repudiated. It would be asinine for anyone to argue that Jonah's and Savannah's best interests are
served with this lack of proper jurisprudence.

For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief that the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations
with the Special Master's orders and the bench directives ordering an evaluation without abiding
by the parameters of the established rule.
CASE LAW
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #4: Utah Code Ann.
Section 70-3-5.2 and 30-3-10.10 Parenting plan - Domestic violence.
(1) In any proceeding regarding a parenting plan, the court shall consider evidence of
domestic violence, if presented.
(2) If there is a protective order, civil stalking injunction, or the court finds that a parent
has committed domestic violence, the court shall consider the impact of domestic
violence in awarding parent-time, and make specific findings regarding the award of
parent-time
In the instant case, the Fourth Judicial District Court ignored evidence presented to it of
domestic violence - of the father abusing the mother in front of the children prior to their divorce,
and substantiated by reports from Child Protective Services, a hospital crisis worker, and a police
officer. The father's abuse included threatening the mother with a loaded gun and choking the
mother until the mother passed out. (See Addendum G) Medical tests have now substantiated
that the mother's disability was caused by trauma to the brain, believed to have caused two
strokes that were triggered when her then-husband beat her and suffocated her in rampages of
domestic violence between April of 1999 and November of 2001.
For these reasons, it is LaRue's perspective and belief th^t the Fourth Judicial District
Court violated Utah Code Ann. Section 70-3-5.2 and 30-3-10.10 Parenting plan - Domestic
violence when it did not consider the evidence of domestic violence presented to it prior to
entering its order that terminated LaRue's parental rights for six months. The court effectively
modified the ordered parenting plan without considering the impact of domestic violence on the
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children or the mother, and did not enter specific findings related to the domestic violence in the
family dynamics, nor in the parenting plan that was implemented^
CASE LAW
PERCEIVED STATUTORY CODE VIOLATION #5: Question of jurisdiction and
appropriate modification of a court order under UFISA parameters.
In this case, it appears that the ruling by the district court Was not consistent with the law
of this state, nor had the district court established jurisdiction to make a modification under the
oversight of UFISA.
ARGUMENT:
ISSUES 3 & 4: VIOLATION OF THE CHILDREN'S AND THE MOTHER'S RIGHTS
It is LaRue's perspective and belief that the district court continues to violate the
children's right to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to their mother, and to have
their mother actively involved in their lives. It is LaRue's belief that the children's rights and her
right to due process have been denied.
It is LaRue's perspective and belief that the Fourth Judicial District Court violated Utah
Code in granting authority to the Special Master to terminate Larue's parental rights and
substantially modify parent time over a period of sixteen months without regard to the children's
best interests and without affording the children the rights granted to them by the state of Utah.
LaRue believes that because these actions have been taken by the Fourth Judicial District
Court without allowing LaRue the opportunity to present evidence to the court, and after
canceling a hearing set to address these issues, that LaRue's and the children's rights to due
process have been denied.
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CONCLUSION:
The Utah Court of Appeals should reverse and remand the district court's rulings and orders
regarding child support and parenting time and order a hearing that affords due process for the
following reasons:
1. Regarding the assessment of child support, there was no prior court order accessing child
support, no substantial change of circumstance was presented nor acknowledged, no child
support worksheets were filed by either party, no requirement of LaRue to file a proposed
award of child support, no adjustment under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) was requested
nor accepted, sufficient evidence was not presented to ret^ut the guidelines, there were no
specific findings of fact to rebut the guidelines, and "arrearages" were assessed in
violation of the guidelines set forth in Utah Code.
2. Regarding imputation of income, the imputation ignored ihe work history and earnings
over the previous nine years. The judge imputed a greater income, but did not enter
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for thel imputation. The judge imputed
income even though LaRue's medical disabilities rendered her physically unable to earn
minimum wage, with evidence presented that this physical disability had affected LaRue
for almost two years prior to the "ruling" issued by the cc^urt.
3. The court disregarded substantial evidence presented to it that the low income table was
applicable in determining the adjusted gross income for LaRue, and then did not require
documentation or consideration of other sources of income that would impact the
adjusted gross income for Arne.
4. The judge did not enter a written finding or specific finding on the record that use of the
rebuttable child support guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best
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interest of the child(ren). The qualifications were not met to rebut the presumption for
determination of the amount of child support to be ordere<ji.
5. The question of jurisdiction and appropriate modification of a court order under UFISA
parameters was not addressed.
6. The court violated Utah Code in granting authority to the [Special Master to terminate
LaRue's parental rights and substantially modify parent time over a period of sixteen
months without regard to the children's best interests.
7. The prohibition of Jonah's and Savannah's contact with their mother for such an
extended period of time does not meet the legislated standards for the children to have
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent. The punitive measures of the
Special Master, and vague orders of the court, prohibit th$ children from having their
mother actively involved in their lives.
8. No claim, nor evidence, has been presented to the Court, and no finding has been made
by a preponderance of evidence, that the mother would harm, or has the potential to harm
her children.
9. The Special Master has made repeated inferences to LaRue's disabilities, and
misrepresented the impact of those disabilities to the court and to other professionals
involved in this matter. LaRue has not been given the opportunity at any time to rebut
those inferences, as the court has simply allowed the Special Master to terminate LaRue's
parental rights and suspend LaRue's visitation, without aijiy orders or presentation of
evidence to object to or to rebut.
10. Over a period of sixteen months, neither the Special Master, nor the Guardian Ad Litem,
nor the court has made reasonable reunification efforts for the children and for LaRue.
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The court did not enter the reasons underlying its order of less parent-time for LaRue.
Throughout this time, no attempt has been made to consider the best interests of Jonah
and Savannah.
11. In the evaluation ordered by the court that has substantially altered custody for sixteen
months, Rule 4-903 has not been followed.
12. The court ignored evidence presented to it of domestic violence - of the father abusing
the mother in front of the children prior to their divorce, and of repeated stalking and
harassment of the mother by the father after the divorce, including when the mother and
the children were out of state. The mother's reports of domestic violence and the
children's resulting fear of their father were substantiated I by reports from Child
Protective Services, a hospital crisis worker, and a police [officer. During a period of time
when a temporary civil Stalking Injunction was in place protecting the mother from the
father's harassing behavior, the judge totally disregarded a fellow judge's discernment,
and denied the mother all avenues of possible protection in case the harassment
continued.
13. There has been no court hearing regarding this matter. There has been no preponderance
of evidence of real harm presented to the court, nor substantiated potential harm to the
child(ren) alleged in any forum. In court hearings convened to address separate matters,
such as child support, the court has heard only the opinion of the Special Master, yet not
allowed any discussion or presentation of evidence by either side.
14. After an extensive investigation, DCFS determined that the allegations that the mother
had emotionally abused the children could not be substantiated. After the DCFS
conclusions were in the favor of the mother, the Special Master stated that the DCFS
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Minnie LaRue Thomas
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ADDENDUM A - Jurisdiction
LaRue humbly requests that this Court recognize her pro ^e status, without disdain.
LaRue has no legal education, and suffers a medical disability, that can be incapacitating at
times. The process of attempting to file a credible appellant brief has overwhelmed LaRue with
the limitations of her knowledge of the judicial process and her ability to present a logical
argument.
The only reason LaRue is appearing pro se is because she could not afford to hire an
attorney to file an appeal on her behalf. LaRue begs this Court to understand this as a desperate
situation, and not to interpret LaRue's attempts herein as opposition to or lack of respect of the
court's authority. LaRue's father devoted his entire life to military service, law enforcement, and
caring for those less fortunate. Her parents instilled within her a deep respect for the laws of our
land, and the judicial system that upholds those laws. That respect abides.
LaRue believes that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, previously
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3h. With the recent changes enacte4 by the 2008 General Session
of the Legislature in the Annotated Code 78, 78 A, and 78B, it is unclear to her which statute to
reference. The changes from the 2008 General Session have also fnade it more difficult and time
intensive for her, as a layman, to determine the proper statutes to reference when referring to
child support and parenting time guidelines - especially when referring to prior case law. LaRue
does not request special treatment, but rather reasonable and holistic consideration of this
complex case, and equitable measures to ensure that the best interests of her children are being
enforced.
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ADDENDUM B - Medical documentation
The onset of LaRue's disabling condition was in July of 2005, after receiving a penicillin
shot for strept throat. She began having chronic daily intractable migraine headaches in
September of 2006. Due to the frequent complex migraines that present with stroke-like
symptoms, LaRue is presently under the care of IHC Home Health Care, and requires the
services of a Home Health Care nurse in her home each week. L^Rue must have assistance with
normal activities of daily living. Doctors have documented that LaRue has a "fair" chance of
resuming previous physical activity. LaRue does not know if shej will be able to return to fulltime work in the future.
The doctors had great difficulty determining the root cause of LaRue's medical disability,
and at separate times over the past several years, specialists have diagnosed LaRue and begun
treatment for Rheumatoid Arthritis, and possible Multiple Sclerosis. After testing positive for
late-stage acute Lyme disease, LaRue was under an intensive IV antibiotic regimen. The
antibiotics were effective, and it appears that the Lyme disease is now in remission. The Lyme
Disease, which is a bacterial infection that can "bore" into tissue and sequester in the central
nervous system, is believed to have caused LaRue's infectious symptoms of a toxic nature that
were originally thought to be Rheumatoid Arthritis or Multiple Sclerosis.
Brain MRTs and other clinical tests from March-June of 2007 gave evidence that LaRue
has suffered at least two incidents of stroke-like damage to her brain. The lesions on her brain,
believed to be the result of scar tissue from the strokes, or possibly from mild traumatic brain
injuries, result in chronic daily headaches and other debilitating heurological dysfunction. For
approximately one year, the pendency of the subject matter of this appeal, LaRue had to undergo
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IV therapy via the PICC line for 2-8 hours every day to manage chronic daily migraine
headaches, and for emergent intervention of minor strokes, or transient ischemic attacks (TIAs).
Since March 29, 2007, LaRue has suffered more than ten complex migraines that present with
stroke-like symptoms that required emergency medical intervention. These "minor strokes,"
sometimes referred to as TIA's (Transient Ischemic Attacks), render LaRue virtually
incapacitated for several weeks.
LaRue suffered a TIA that required emergency medical care in Commissioner Thomas
Patton's courtroom on December 6, 2007, after the hearing and (Commissioner Patton had left
the room. Recognizing the stroke symptoms, LaRue's attorney and others called 911. EMT's
responded, and transported LaRue via a gurney out of the courthouse, to the ambulance, and to
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. LaRue later passed out while being treated in the
Emergency Room.
On March 21, 2008, LaRue suffered a complex migraine that presented with stroke-like
symptoms, thought to be another TIA. After ambulance transport to LDS Hospital in Salt Lake
City, it was discovered that LaRue had several DVTs (Deep Veiiji Thromboses), which are blood
clots. To prevent a possible stroke, heart attack, or pulmonary embolism from the DVTs, LaRue
is presently injecting Lovenox twice daily and is under home health until she is stabilized on
Coumadin. LaRue is under close supervision of a team of medical professionals.
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TO:

Todd Thayne
Utah Office of Recovery Services

FROM:

M. LaRue Thomas
1885 Harvard Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84108

r?

.

Qo\

.544

A &* ^

801.787.8887
MLaRueThomas@kinextions.com

DATE:
RE:

January 24, 2008
MEDICAL DISABILITY INFORMATION

Thank you for taking the time today to direct me to the website www.ors.utah.gov, and to inform
me of what further information would be helpful Transmitted please find the medical disability
information you requested.
MEDICAL DISABILITY INFORMATION:
1. Letter from Dr. Pamela Vincent and Dr. Victoria Sucher, dated 7/6/2007. This letter
documents:
a. Onset of this flare of debilitating symptoms in July 2005, becoming completely
disabling by September 2006. (Page 1, paragraph 2.)
b. "Minnie is slowly showing improvement each month, but currently is still
disabled. She is unable to think clearly at times and showing (sic) toxic
symptoms of an infections nature. She continues to have debilitating complex
migraines that could be due to absorption issues of electrolytes in the
gastrointestinal system." (Page 2, paragraph 2.)
2. Doctor's order from Patrice Duvernay, Neurologist, extending home health and skilled
nursing care through 06/24/2008.
3. Home Health Re-Certification and Plan of Care from IHC Home Health Care, dated
12/03/2007certifying that I am homebound due to my medical disability, and that my
rehabilitation potential is fair for return to previous physical status. (Page 3, top of page.)
4. Letter from Dr. Mitchell Freedman, dated 11/22/2002, documenting the doctors' earlier
diagnosis of possible Multiple Sclerosis, and stating that I could not work full-time to
earn an income "while combating the overwhelming physical limitations she faces."
(paragraph 3.)
I will fax the remaining information you requested to you in the ^iext few business days, as that
information will take longer to compile and prepare for transmission. Please contact me if you
require any further information.
Sincerely, LaRue Thomas

'

'

^H^^TU^2^

Pdmeld Vmuenl, MD-PC
Victoria Sucher ND
Integrated Healing Arts-Utah
Riverwoods Neurological Center
280 West River Park Drive Suite 350
Provo, Utah 84604
telephone (801) 229-1014
fa*(BM)2M-10B7
www nverwoodsneurological com

7/6/2007
Dear Terry Spencer, Attorney at Law
In response to your request for information re Minnie LaRue Thomas
Minnie LaRue has been seen for WHITE MATTER OF BRAIN SYNDROME NOS (323 9), VARIANTS
OF MIGRAINE WITH INTRACTABLE MIGRAINE, SO STATED (346.21); LYME DISEASE (088 81), and
FACTOR V DEFICIENCY, NOS (286 3) (Leiden thrombophilia) She was first seen in this office for a
consult on 11/7/06 for multiple complaints of episodic neurological symptoms that had begun about 16
years ago Each flare of symptoms were related to stressful periods such as the births of children and/or
usually a course of antibiotic therapy After a few days on the antibiotics she would have a flare of the
muscle aches and joint swelling that would show up liKe a Rheumatoid Arthritis picture The joints would
not always be the same though She reported having a truncal rash with the first flare of symptoms 16
years ago that did not itch and seemed to resolve on its own
The migramea and the muaculoskeletal aymptoma worsened in July 2005 following a shot of penicillin for

Strep throat The symptoms became debilitating by Sect 2006 when she was referred here to this office
Previous MRI's were reviewed showing a few white matter lesions that appeared to be stable She had
blood work at that initial visit to discover if there was a reason for the white matter lesions and the
neurological symptoms-

It was demonstrated at that tim^ that she was. positive for Factor V Ljeiden

thrombophilia, which can contribute to the formation of thrombotic white matter lesions
This did not explain many of the neurological symptoms that she was having, but possibly explained the
migraines The question of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) or Chronic Lyme disease was ra«sed because of the
nature of the symptom history, the progression of symptoms and previous travel to areas know to have
Lyme disease She had had a spmai tap previously that had not shown to be diagnostic for Multiple
Sclerosis (MS) so a Lyme titer was preformed, which came back with two highly specific bands for Lyme
and one non specific band for Lyme disease As per the CDC and the ILADS criteria, the clinical diagnosis
of Chronic Lyme disease was made
She had a PICC line placed and started on IV antibiotics in combination wuh two oral antibiotics as per the
ILADS treatment protocol for the treatment of Chronic Lyme disease after clearance from the Factor V
Leiaen specialist in Norm Carolina Tne first week on tne antibiotics sne ten worse as expected, wmc h
started to resolve to the point that she reported feeling more normal for the first time in several years
Then she was seen in the ER twice within a six week period (3/30 and 5/9) with complicated migraine
h

eadac h e5 (hat presented with stiokc-like ^ymptuni^

The migraines would escalate to the point that the

left side of her body would go limp, she started to slur her words, be incoherent at times, and bilateral
blindness This worried her and she was started on Calan-SR for migraine prevention by Dr Renner, which
seemed to help some She was temporarily taken off the antibiotics to determine if they were tnadverrently
contributing to the complicated migramee

Then it was shown that if ehe was given Normal SaUne at the

beginning of a migraine it would start to resolve and not progress into the complicated migraines that she
was starting to get more frequently
She also had a abdominal CT scan done that showed something wrong with the liver so an ultrasound was
done that showed possibly two abscesses in the liver A referral to a hepatologist at LDS was made for
further work up It was suggested that a biopsy be done this coming month and a Lyme titer with bacteria
culture be done to see if the Lyme spirochete or some other bacteria is causing the abscesses She will be

placed back on IV antibiotics by the end of the month and if the Lyme spirochete is irk the abacesaes of the

liver then another 4-6 months of antibiotics may be necessary to completely eradicate it If the Lyme
spirochete is not responsible for the liver abscesses, then whatever is present should be cleared first then
the ILADS Chronic Lyme protocol should be followed for another 3 months or one month after symptoms
resolve Qna tne CD57 NK neil nount is ahrwp 100 (35%)

Minnie is slowly showing improvement each month, but currently is still disabled She is unable to think
clearly at times and showing toxic symptoms of an infectious nature She continues to have debilitating
complex migraines that could be due to absorption issues o' e'ectro'ytes in the gastrointestinal system
This could possibly be related back to the issues with the liver at the present moment Her last liver
function tests were normal
Please contact my office if additional information is needed
l ime spent preparing this report 60 minutes
Please contact my office if additional information is needed
Time spent preparing this report 60 minutes
Thank you,
Victoria Sucher. N D

cc

Christian Burrdige, Attorney at Law
Minnie LaRue Tliunidb
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Address*
Phone:
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2250 SOUTH 1300 WEST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT, B4119
(801) 887-7353
27021
/ 8264285
THOMAS, MINNIE L
1S8S HARVARD AVE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84X08
(
)
KELLY GARCIA, CPHT ftc/fl **>/*./
jr
LYME DISEASE
(P **
r*(f07

Prescription Information:

Preacription #: 030715
Order #: 70142
Psge #:
1

0.9%
500 ML
INFUSE THROUGH PICC LIKE AT 7 0 ML/KR
OVER 8 HOyps CTERY DAY. FLUSH LINE AS
DIRECTED.
—
SODIUM CHLORIDE

QTY DISPENSED:
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Stop Date:

Type of Equipment:
Other Prescription Iteme: SET IV DIAL-A-FLO CUSTOM
LABEL IV TUBING CHANGE 1000/RL
CAP MALE STERILE LIFESHIELD
PROTECTOR PICC CATH ARM CTF£
TAPE TRANSPORS 1" 1527-1 3M 12
|

Toot

Refill Date; 06/24/0B

24, ^OS..

Physician Signature:
Subst i tut i"on PermI 11ed

Date:

MD

MD
""Dispense Aa~~Written

DUVERNAY, PATRICE A
SALT LAKE CLINIC- NEURO
333 SOUTH $00 EAST
Salt Latas Cit/, UT 84132Phone; (801} 535-8129
FAX: (601) 355-3746
Dea #: ED2492940
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RALEIGH
NEUROLOGY
ASSOCIATES,

PA

November 22, 2002
To Whom It May Concern:
Re: LaRue Thomas
RNA: 96078
Dear Sir or Madam:
LaRue Thomas is a 39 year old, 5' 10", 125 lb., white female that has been
professionally diagnosed with multi-level DJD, DDD, premature osteoarthritis, trigeminal
neuralgia and other neurological and musculo-skeletal symptoms that have plagued her
for most of her adult life, most predominately over the last six years. The onset of the
worst of the neurological symptoms coincided with complications after delivery of her
two children, after which she caught internal infections resulting in septicemia.
LaRue is presently experiencing exacerbations of symptoms that limit her ability to work
productively in an office setting for more than a couple of hours at a time. She is
undergoing initial treatment, and we are conducting tests to ascertain the root cause of
the symptoms with which she now struggles on a daily basis. At least one specialist has
indicated that LaRue may have multiple sclerosis.
It is hard to expect require LaRue to work full-time to earn an income while combating
the overwhelming physical limitations she faces. It is anticipated that we will have a
clearer diagnosis within the next three to six weeks. A treatment plan utilizing all
available treatment methods can be implemented. I am hoping that she will improve
over the next 6 months.
LaRue has exhibited admirable personal strength and fortitude to face the health issues
that plague her, and she is dedicated to heartily resuming a productive lifestyle of
successful professional endeavors once we have completed proper diagnostic
procedures and applicable treatment plans.
Feel free to contact me If necessary.

fell Freedman, MD
:wr
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78B-12-202. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless there has
been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee or adjustment under
Subsection 788-12-210(6) has been made.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for
prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a
showing of a material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award required by the
guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, or a petition to
modify an order under Subsection 788-12-210(6) has been filed, the court determining the amount of
prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may be granted.
(3) If the courtfindssufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, th$ court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or
on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon
the guidelines described in this chapter.
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Rule 103. Child support worksheets.
(a) When filing a child support worksheet required by Utah Code Section 78-45-7.3, a party shall:
(a)(1) file the worksheet in duplicate and the clerk of court shall send one copy to the Administrative Office of the Courts; or
(a)(2) file one worksheet with the court, send the information on the worksheet electronically to the Administrative Office
and so indicate on the worksheet.
(b) The court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, final order of modification, or final decree of paternity until the
completed worksheet is filed.

IN THE

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
( p i N T PHYSICAL CUSTODY)

vs.
Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table:
[X] 78B-12-301(1)
[ ] 78B-12-302(2) Effective January 1, 2008

Civil No.
MOTHER
11. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for whom
support is to be awarded.
|2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to Instructions for
definition of income.
|2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter alimony
ordered for this case).
|2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered for the
1 children in Line 1).
|2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home
Worksheet for either parent.
|3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a This is the Adjusted Gross Income for child
support purposes.
|4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 1 to the
Support Table. Enter the Combined Support Obligation here.
|5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED adjusted
monthly gross in Line 3.
|6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the Base
Support Obligation.
7. Enter the number of nights the children will spend with each parent. (They must
total 365.) Each parent must have at least 111 overnights to qualify for Joint Physical
Custody. (UCA78B-12-217(13)
|7b. Identify the parent who has the lesser number of overnights, and continue
the rest of the calculation for them. You will be making adjustments to the net
amount owed by this parent.
|8a. For the parent who has the child the lesser number of overnights, multiply
the number of overnights that are greater than 110 but less than 131 by .0027 i
to obtain a resulting figure and enter in the respective column.
|8b. Multiply the result on line 8a by the Combined Support Obligation on line
4 for this parent and enter the number in the respective column.
|8c. Subtract the respective dollar amount on line 8b from this parent's share of
the Base Support Obligation found in the column for this parent on line 6 to
determine the amount as indicated by UCA 78B-12-208(3)(a) and enter the
amount in the respective column.
|9a. Additional calculation necessary if both parents have the child for more than
131 overnights (Otherwise go to line 10): For the parent who has the child the lesser
number of overnights, multiply the number of overnights that exceed 130(131
overnights or more) by .0084 to obtain a resulting figure and enter it in the respective
column.
|9b. Multiply the result on line 9a by the Combined Support Obligation on line
4 for this parent and enter each in the respective column.
|
|9c. Subtract this parent's dollar amount on line 9b from their respective
amount as identified on line 8c to determine the amount as indicated by UCAi
78B-12-209(3)(b) and enter the amount in the respective column. Go to line
10.

FATHER

COMBINED
2

$ 0.00

$ 6,250.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1 $ o.oo

$ 6,250.00

$ 6,250.00

$ 1,150.00 1
0%

100%

$ 0.00

$ 1,150.00

111
Mother

254

365

1
1

0.0027

$3.10
$-3.10

0.0000

$ 0.00
$-3.10

6/2000

10. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: If the result in line 9c is > 0, then this parent is the obligor (and the other
parent is the obligee). Enter the amount owed by this parent to the obligee all 12 months of the year. If the result in
line 9c is < 0, then this parent is the obligee (and the other parent is the obligor). Enter the absolute value of the
result in line 9c here. This is the amount owed to this parent by the obligor all 12 months of the year.
11.

Which parent is the obligor?

12.

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 10? ( ) Yes ( ) No

( ) Mother ( X ) Father

If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
13.

, and answer number 1^.

What were the reasons stated by the court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( ) other:

Attorney Bar No.

$3.10

( ) Electronic Filing

^___

( ) Manual Filing

6/2000

6/2000

78B-12-203. Determination of gross income — Imputed incomd
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any source,
including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust
income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers'
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits,
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. If
and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and consistently
worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from groks income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or
General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operationfromgross receipts.
The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted
from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income
determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date
pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year
unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer
statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or
overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the
parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the
imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and
probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the con^munity, or the median earning for
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical
area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income shall be
imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the
judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a
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temporary nature:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents1 minor children approach or equal the amount of
income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wag£;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the
home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child
support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security
Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as
child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the
potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a
parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
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78B-12-205. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their adjusted gross
incomes, unless the low income table is applicable. Except during periods of court-ordered parent-time
as set forth in Section 78B-12-216, the parents are obligated to pay their proportionate shares of the base
combined child support obligation. If physical custody of the child changes from that assumed in the
original order, modification of the order is not necessary, even if only one parent is specifically ordered
to pay in the order.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 78B-12-102 and
in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the base child support
award shall be determined as follows:
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base combined child support
obligation using the base combined child support obligation table; and
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support obligation by
multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted
gross income.
(3) In the case of an incapacitated adult child, any amount that the incapacitated adult child can
contribute to the incapacitated adult child's support may be considered in the determination of child
support and may be used to justify a reduction in the amount of support ordered, except that in the case
of orders involving multiple children, the reduction shall not be greater than the effect of reducing the
total number of children by one in the child support table calculation.
(4) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of either parent is between $650 and $1,050,
the base child support award shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection
(2) and the amount calculated using the low income table. If the income and number of children is found
in an area of the low income table in which no amount is shown, the base combined child support
obligation table is to be used.
(5) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for
up to six children. For more than six children, additional amounts may be added to the base child
support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by Subsection 788-12-210(3), the amount ordered may not
be less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children.
(6) If the monthly adjusted gross income of either parent is $649 or less, the tribunal shall determine
the amount of the child support obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award may
not be less than $30.
(7) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of children, not an
amount per child.
(8) For all worksheets, income and support award figures shall be rounded to the nearest dollar.
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78B-12-302. Low income table - Obligor parent only.
(1) If a child support order is established or modified on or before December 31,2007, the table in
this Subsection (1) shall be used for a modification to that order made on or before December 31,2009.
Monthly Adj.
Gross Income
Number of Children
1 2
3
4
5
6

From

To

650-675

23

23

23

23

24
24

676-700

45

46

46

47

47
48

701-725

68

68

69

70

71
71

726-750

90

91

92

93

94
95

751-775

113

114

115

116

118
119

776-800

137

138

140

141
143

801-825

159

161

163

165
166

826-850

182

184

186

188
190

851-875

205

207

209

212
214

876-900

228

230

233

235
238

901-925

250

253

256

259
261

926-950

276

279

282
285

951-975

299

302

306
309

976-1,000

326

329
333
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78B-12-206. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in the table, an appropriate
and just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not
be less than the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
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78B-12-210. Application of guidelines - Use of ordered child support
(1) The guidelines in this chapter apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or
modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the
amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines,
the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent
with these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated
order.
(4) The following shall be considered deviationsfromthe guidelines, if:
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviationfromthe guidelines;
(b) the guidelines worksheet has:
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and
(ii) an explanation as to the reason; or
(c) the deviation is made because there were more children than provided for in the guidelines table.
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ by $10 or more:
(a) the order is considered deviated; and
(b) the incomes listed on the worksheet may not be used in adjusting support for emancipation.
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and are not
children in common to both parties may at the option of either party be taken into account under the
guidelines in setting or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not
be given if:
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists would have their
child support reduced; or
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor would increase.
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for
the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtractedfromthe appropriate parent's income
before determining the award in the instant case.
(7) In a proceeding to adjust or modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive
children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both parties may be applied to
mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied:
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of the obligor
from the most recent order; or
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee would be decreased
from the most recent order.
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous three
years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may move the court to adjust the amount of a child support
order.
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best
interests of the child:
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support amount and the
payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; and
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), adjust the payor's ordered support
amount to the payor's support amount provided in the guidelines if:
(A) the difference is 10% or more;
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(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does not deviatefromthe guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an adjustment under this
Subsection (8).
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount
of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. A change in the base
combined child support obligation table set forth in Section 78B-12-301 is not a substantial change in
circumstances for the purposes of this Subsection (9).
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best
interests of the child:
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred;
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the change results in a difference of 15%
or more between the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that would be
required under the guidelines; and
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines if:
(A) there is a difference of 15% or more; and
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature.
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9) shall be
included in each child support order.
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78B-12-212. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be provided by
a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, the
court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance.
(4) The parent who provides the insurance coverage may receive credit against the base child support
award or recover the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium. In cases in which the
parent does not have insurance but another member of the parent's household provides insurance
coverage for the children, the parent may receive credit against the base child support award or recover
the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium.
(5) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The
premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of
persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant
case.
(6) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured
medical expenses incurred for the dependent children, including but not limited to deductibles and
copayments.
(7) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other
parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before
January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of Recovery
Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date the parent first knew or
should have known of the change.
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and payment
of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring medical expenses may
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the
expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8).
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"(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any source,
including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages,
commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains .. ."

Misrem^senmtion. A second instance wherein Petitioner violates Utah
Annotred Cod<^r&-45-7.5r Petitioner intoajR that disclosure of W2 inc^meis theiCourt's only
requir^neni^r Mr. Jacoqpen tor tnejfurposes

Petitioner #en
in-kind

vehemently argues that fie Comfimist include
resources available to Ms. Thomas.
Thomas suffered two strokes, as a direct result of Mr.

His abuse of her included

Jacobs

'occasions in

threatd
the piflsenjj^of their two cnjdren wfterj^ney were young.

now disabled from the

brain injuries caused by theprokejjf&nd is unable to work.
Jj

flHP

^Tl0T

t0

^ i e divorce, Ms. Thomas' income) was NOT $50,000 per year.

In fact, and substantiated by evidence presented in court, Ms. Th6mas' average annual income
for nine of the past ten years has been $12, 828.33. As presented by counsel at the April 9, 2007
hearing, Ms. Thomas' income prior to the divorce and for the subsequent five years was:
1997
1998
1999
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

9 - YEAR TOTAL INCOME

$ 25,832
$0
$0
$ 26,364
$ 20,495
$12,201
$25,197
$
104
$ 5.262
$ 115.455

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME

$ 12,82833

per year

2006 TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME

$ 5,262

2006 AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME

$ 438.50

$ 1069.03 per month

per month

IRS filings from the 1997-2000 tax years prove tl)at Mr. Jacobsen's income was
over $850,000 in that three-to-four year period. As substantiated with federal income
documentation, and reiterated above, Ms. Thomas' income during that same time period was
$25,832. To repeat, Mr. Jacobsen's income was $850,000, Ms. Thomas' was $25,000.
The only aberration to Ms. Thomas' earnings history over the entire ten year
period listed above was the year 2000, prior to the divorce, wher} Ms. Thomas worked part-time
for her husband (Petitioner, Mr. Jacobsen). Mr. Jacobsen was thp CEO of the company. He
demanded that his wife work at least part-time, even though their children were two- and oneyears old. Respondent wanted to be home full-time with the children, but their father insisted that
she work for his business and the children be cared for by a surrogate caregiver. Mr. Jacobsen set
Ms. Thomas' salary at $52,201 for the year 2000. His intentions to financially harm Ms. Thomas
and not provide for his children are obvious; he filed for divorce on January 19, 2001. He then
used the artificially-high "salary" he paid to his wife the last year they were married to
manipulate this Court into imputing Ms. Thomas' income at more than double the annual income
she rightfully earned working full-time during the ten years prior,
It is apparent that Mr. Jacobsen set Ms. Thomas' salary at such a high level when she
worked for him part-time in the year 2000 to maximize his personal financial gain and reduce his
obligation to support his children when he divorced their mother+ When Ms. Thomas expressed
disagreement with the financial settlement that he demanded wh$n he filed for divorce, Mr.
Jacobsen assaulted her in such aggressive acts of domestic violence, that he caused her to suffer

two strokes. Mr. Jacobsen intentionally manipulated the legal system to shirk his obligations tor
child support for their two children and his duty to pay alimony ^o his wife, and continues to do
so six years later in his misrepresentations to this Court.
9

Misrepresentation. The salient point in determining the best interests of the

children is that at all times since the divorce on May 14, 2001, Ms. Thomas has provided a
wonderful home and nurturing environment for their two children. In spite of the enormous
discrepancies in their earnings history and potential, Mr. Jacobsep has not paid one penny of
child support, nor alimony, since the divorce.
Petitioner confuses his dollar figures, and is deceitful in the
amounts he presents to tie Court. His cor)d0i<m is not only erroneous, but alsc^kpeptive. It is
difficult to ascertain^ny reliance upomne Utpn Code Annotated 78-45-7J^) in M proposed
findings to justif^Tmonthly impdred income of $9,000. Utah C0deJmnotated^8-45-7.5(7)
specifically stams with regarc^to impulja income:

JF

m

(7) (a) Income may not bepnputed torn parent unless the pajmrit stipulatemo the amount imputed,
the parent c»raults, or, uncontested apes, a hearing is hekfcnd the judgmn a judicial proceeding
or the presming officejifn an adminfttrative proceeding^iters findings Mf fact as to the
evidential basis for me, imputation
M
m
(b) If inofrne is imptted to a pareJt, the income shaU^e based upon jpployment potential and
probabl#earningsiK derived from employment opportunities, work Mstory, occupation
qualifications, a y prevailing earnings for person#of similar backgrounds in the community, or
the meftan eanwig for persons MI the same oc^pation in the sameMeographical
area aMfound^i the statistics nmintained by re Bureau of Labor Sratistics.
(c) Iff parent has no recent work historwr a parent's occupation is unknown, income
shall l e inputed at least at me federal jainimum wage for a 41-hour work week. To impute
a greJtf^income, the judge In a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding mall ente/specific findings of facias to the evidentiary basis for
the imputation.
I
m
I
(d) Income may not be implied jjlany of the following conditions exist and the condition is not
of a temporary nature:
^^r
1
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor childr^rapproach or equal the amount
of income the custodial parent can earn;
^^
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimuip w a g ^ (emphasis added)

Ms. Thomas fully complied with all stipulations of disclosure of income, gifts, and other
resources to meet the Utah Child Support Obligation Calculation Guidelines. Counsel presented
all relevant documents regarding Ms. Thomas' past, present, and (potential earnings during the
April 9, 2007 hearing.
Examples of Petitioner's erroneous representations to the court are his inclusion, "for the
purposes of fixing child support," payments Ms. Thomas made fdr private school tuition, and
legal fees that the Special Master and this Court ordered that Ms. Thomas pay. In the Utah
Parenting Plan Ordered by the Honorable Judge Schofield, page 4|, number 8, it is ordered that:
". . . LaRue shall retain legal counsel on an on-going

basis..."

Mr. Jacobsen, through his counsel, Mr. Green, attempts to manipulate the Court into
penalizing Ms. Thomas for complying with its order, and then counting payments she made for
private school tuition and to attorneys, as ordered by the Special Master and by the Court, a
second time as "income." It is indeed Mr. Jacobsen's physical abuse and ongoing "scorched
earth" policy with regards to relentless vexatious litigation against the mother of his children, that
left Ms. Thomas with mounting legal and medical bills in the face of her disability, and no other
alternative but to file bankruptcy.

jj

flflf-

As stated, during the time period in question, Ms. Thomas paid more than

$6,940 directly to Mr. Jacobsen for the children and/or for private school tuition at Mr.
Jacobsen's insistence that the children not attend public schools. Thle assertion that the "children
receive no support from their mom" is ludicrous. Mr. Jacobsen evades the disclosure stipulations
of the Utah Uniform Civil Liabilities for Support Act and misrepresents the amounts spent and
amounts available for the support of the two minor children. Mr. Jacobsen threatened to "burn

every penny" Ms. Thomas ever made by manipulating the courts to take their children away from
her. He has succeeded in bankrupting his children's mother aijid avoiding his legal and
appropriate financial obligations to his own children.
12

False. As presented by Mr. Jacobsen, his monthly regular income since January

of 2006 is $7,500. Due to her disabilities from the two strokes jfrom her ex-husband's assaults,
Ms. Thomas' monthly income is zero. The parties' combined incomes do not exceed "the chart'*.
In fact Judge Schofield's Ruling on Child Support specifically states: "It is appropriate,
particularly given that Ms. Thomas9 income is support from her friend/fiance, that the
court not exceed the chart in calculating child support." (Ruling, item 12.)
13

Agreed. Other than welfare from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,

and assistance paying rent and medical bills, Ms. Thomas has ha$ no income from outside
sources for over a year, since August of 2006.
14

Agreed. Since September of 2006, Ms. Thomas is completely disabled from the

strokes that resulted from her ex-husband's acts of violence against her. She is unable to work,
and has had to rely on other sources of income for her subsistence
15 m False. Not supportj0roy\vidence.
16j

False. Not s»5orted b}JPvidence.
Misrepresentation. Am presented extensively by legal counsel at the April 9,

2007JTearing, beajfise of the perv»ive disability brougl^nby thelrain damage from the
strafes, nojms than eleven mecmal specialistsjma been consulte#prior to the hearing. Since
lem were in various mases ofa^tmg to reach a diagn«is. there was no quantitative
medical evidence to produce at the time of the hearing. As evi«|mcej^ffnofficial documents
from the federal department of Social Security Disability that were ^lso presented at the hearing,

30-3-32. Parent-time — Intent — Policy — Definitions.
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all parties'
interests.
(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and the parent who is
the victim of domestic or family violence.
(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to
the child:
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to have
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce;
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for frequent,
meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best interests; and
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting the child.
(c) An order issued by a court pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act shall be
considered evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child.
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents.
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child gets out of
school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the child returns to school,
except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other thatt a weekend, holiday as provided
in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(3) and
(15), and "Christmas school vacation."
(d) "Virtual parent-time" means parent-time facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant
messaging, video conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet or other
communication media to supplement in-person visits between a noncustodial parent and a child or
between a child and the custodial parent when the child is staying with the noncustodial parent. Virtual
parent-time is designed to supplement, not replace, in-person parent-tifcne.
(4) If a parent relocates because of an act of domestic violence or family violence by the other parent,
the court shall make specific findings and orders with regards to the application of Section 30-3-37.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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30-3-34. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption.
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a parent-time
schedule consistent with the best interests of the child
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided
in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The parenttime schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the
child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that
more or less parent-time should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's
emotional development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-being
during parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child
during periods of parent-time;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or
an adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
(i) the involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or other related
activities of the child;
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent is
unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled parenttime;
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship prior to the
conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that:
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 303-35.5.
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the schedule except
by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.
Amended by Chapter 255,2001 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 30_03045.ZIP 3,131 Byte$
Sections in this Chapter[Chapters in this Title[All TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised. Friday, February 08, 2008

http://www.le.state.ut.us/-code/TITLE30/htm/30_03045.htm

12.03.2008

30-3-33. Advisory guidelines.
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, advisory
guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. These advisory
guidelines include:
(1) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed
solution;
(2) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's
life;
(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and
other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently
conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(4) the responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the court
when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent modification is
made to the parent-time order;
(5) if the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the
child ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial
home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is
returned;
(6) if the custodial parent will be transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the
appointed place at the time the noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to be
picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable alternate arrangements for the
custodial parent to pick up the child;
(7) regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parent-time
by either parent;
(8) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the work
schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall
not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5;
(9) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the
distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(10) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply
with a court-ordered parent-time schedule;
(11) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being
honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully;
(12) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and
daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the
event of a medical emergency;
(13) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number, email
address, and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change;
(14) each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored
communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is
reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time
is reasonably available, taking into consideration:
(a) the best interests of the child;
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and
(c) any other factors the court considers material;
(15) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court
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shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to
provide child care;
(16) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current
address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise; and
(17) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall
have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
Amended by Chapter 321, 2004 General Session
Amended by Chapter 132,2004 General Session
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30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to ^8 years of age.
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age.
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be considered
the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled:
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the courtfrom5:30 p.m.
until 8:30 p.m.; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child's school is
regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i);
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decreefrom6 p.m.
on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed
on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(b)(i);
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes may not be made to the
regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible
for the child's attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends
beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial
parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may
begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend
until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at
the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iii) spring break beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the
Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Halloween on October 31 or the day Halloween is traditionally celebrated in the local community
from after school until 9 p.m. if on a school day, or from 4 p.m. until 9 p.m.;
(vii) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
and
(viii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3 )(b) plus
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
>
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(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
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(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p m the day before the holiday Until 7 p m on the holiday,
(vu) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p m until Sunday at 7 p m, and
(vm) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3 )(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p m until 9 p m, so long as the entire
Christmas holiday is equally divided,
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even year holidays
in odd years,
(I) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a m until
7 pm on the holiday,
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a m
until 7 p m on the holiday,
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be
(I) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent,
(u) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent, and
(in) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with
these guidelines,
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time during the
children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation,
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended parent-time shall
be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and
phone visits,
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30
days in advance to the other parent, and
(o) telephone contact and other virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably available, shall be
at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time
is reasonably available, taking into consideration
(I) the best interests of the child,
(n) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time, and
(in) any other factors the court considers material
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time order
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), the Halloween holiday may not be extended beyond the
hours designated in Subsection (2)(f)(vi)
Amended by Chapter 302, 2007 General Session
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30-3-36. Special circumstances.
(1) When parent-time has not taken place for an extended period of time and the child lacks an
appropriate bond with the noncustodial parent, both parents shall consider the possible adverse effects
upon the child and gradually reintroduce an appropriate parent-time plan for the noncustodial parent.
(2) For emergency purposes, whenever the child travels with either parent, all of the following will
be provided to the other parent:
(a) an itinerary of travel dates;
(b) destinations;
(c) places where the child or traveling parent can be reached; and
(d) the name and telephone number of an available third person who would be knowledgeable of the
child's location.
(3) Unchaperoned travel of a child under the age of five years is ndt recommended.
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session
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30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -*• Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it
considers appropriate.
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and,
among other factors the court finds relevant, the following:
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties;
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent;
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the
relationship between a parent and child; and
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2.
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is
determined to be in the best interest of the child.
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier of fact determines that
extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony of the children be heard and there
is no other reasonable method to present their testimony.
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding
future custody or parent-time schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling and the court may
determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a child 16 years of age or older
shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor.
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to Subsection (l)(d), they shall
be conducted by the judge in camera. The prior consent of the parties may be obtained but is not
necessary if the court finds that an interview with the children is the only method to ascertain the child's
desires regarding custody.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the courtfindsthat one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has attempted to
permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into consideration in
determining whether to award custody to the other parent.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate against a parent due to a
disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining whether a
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the parent with a
disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the disability by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to
supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the
child at issue.
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings under Title 78B,
Chapter 6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody,
joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the fapiily the widest discretion to
choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.
Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
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30-3-10.10. Parenting plan - Domestic violence.
(1) In any proceeding regarding a parenting plan, the court shall consider evidence of domestic
violence, if presented.
(2) If there is a protective order, civil stalking injunction, or the court finds that a parent has
committed domestic violence, the court shall consider the impact of domestic violence in awarding
parent-time, and make specific findings regarding the award of parent-time.
(3) If the court orders parent-time and a protective order or civil stalking injunction is still in place, it
shall consider whether to order the parents to conduct parent-time pick-up and transfer through a third
party. The parent who is the stated victim in the order or injunction may submit to the court, and the
court shall consider, the name of a person considered suitable to act as the third party.
(4) If the court orders the parents to conduct parent-time through a third party, the parenting plan
shall specify the time, day, place, manner, and the third party to be used to implement the exchange.
Enacted by Chapter 287,2006 General Session
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30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a divorce decree, an
allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court, after making
an inquiry, may order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Child and Family Services
within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 4a. A final award of
custody or parent-time may not be rendered until a report on that investigation, consistent with Section
62A-4a-412, is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and
Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request for ait investigation. In reviewing this
report, the court shall comply with Section 78A-2-227.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Rule 4 - 9 0 3 . Uniform custody evaluations.
Intent:
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation of custody evaluations.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Custody evaluations shall be performed by persons with the following minimum qualifications:
(1)(A) Social workers who hold the designation of Licensed Clinical Social Worker or equivalent license by the state in which
they practice may perform custody evaluations within the scope of their licensure.
(1)(B) Doctoral level psychologists who are licensed by the state in which they practice may perform custody evaluations
within the scope of their licensure.
(1)(C) Physicians who are board certified in psychiatry and are licensed by the state in which they practice may perform
custody evaluations within the scope of their licensure.
(1)(D) Marriage and family therapists who hold the designation of Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist (Masters level
minimum) or equivalent license by the state in which they practice may perform custody evaluations within the scope of
their licensure.
(2) Every motion or stipulation for the performance of a custody evaluation shall include*
(2)(A) the name, address, and telephone number of each evaluator nominated, or p e evaluator agreed upon;
(2)(B) the anticipated dates of commencement and completion of the evaluation and the estimated cost of the evaluation;
(2)(C) specific factors, if any, to be addressed in the evaluation.
(3) Every order requiring the performance of a custody evaluation shall:
(3)(A) require the parties to cooperate as requested by the evaluator;
(3)(B) restrict disclosure of the evaluation's findings or recommendations and privileged information obtained except in the
context of the subject litigation or other proceedings as deemed necessary by the cpurt;
(3)(C) assign responsibility for payment;
(3)(D) specify dates for commencement and completion of the evaluation;
(3)(E) specify any additional factors to be addressed in the evaluation;
(3)(F) require the evaluator to provide written notice to the court, counsel and parties within five business days of
completion (of information-gathering) or termination of the evaluation and, if terminated, the reason;
(3)(G) require counsel or parties to schedule a settlement conference with the c6urt and the evaluator within 45 days of
notice of completion or termination unless otherwise directed by the court so that eyaluator may issue a verbal report; and
(3)(H) require that any party wanting a written custody evaluation to be prepared |give written notice to the evaluator after
the settlement conference.
(4) In divorce cases where custody is at issue, one evaluator may be appointed i?y the court to conduct an impartial and
objective assessment of the parties and submit a written report to the court. When one of the prospective custodians resides
outside of the jurisdiction of the courttwo individual evaluators may be appointed- In cases in which two evaluators are
appointed, the court will designate a primary evaluator. The evaluators must confer prior to the commencement of the
evaluation to establish appropriate guidelines and criteria for the evaluation and $hall submit only one joint report to the
court.
(5) The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with information it can use to make decisions
regarding custody and parenting time arrangements that are in the child's best interest. This is accomplished by assessing
the prospective custodians' capacity to parent, the developmental, emotional, anc} physical needs of the child, and the fit
between each prospective custodian and child. Unless otherwise specified in the order, evaluators must consider and
respond to each of the following factors:
(5)(A) the child's preference;
(5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together;
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians;

(5)(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the child is happy and well
adjusted;
(5)(E) factors relating to the prospective custodians1 character or status or thqir capacity or willingness to function as
parents, including:
(5)(E)(i) moral character and emotional stability;
(5)(E)(u) duration and depth of desire for custody;
(5)(E)(m) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
(5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abute, excessive drinking or other causes;
(5)(E)(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past;
(5)(E)(vi) religious compatibility with the child;
(5)(E)(vn) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status;
(5)(E)(vin) financial condition; and
(5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child, or spouse; and
(5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, or the couk.
(6) In cases in which specific areas of concern exist such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, substance abuse, mental
illness, and the evaluator does not possess specialized training or experience in the area(s) of concern, the evaluator shall
consult with those having specialized training or experience. The assessment sh^all take into consideration the potential
danger posed to the child's custodian and the child(ren).
(7) In cases in which psychological testing is employed as a component of the evaluation, it shall be conducted by a licensed
psychologist who is trained in the use of the tests administered, and adheres to the ethical standards for the use and
interpretation of psychological tests in the jurisdiction in which he or she is licensed to practice. If psychological testing is
conducted with adults and/or children, it shall be done with knowledge of the limits of the testing and should be viewed
within the context of information gained from clinical interviews and other available data. Conclusions drawn from
psychological testing should take into account the inherent stresses associated with divorce and custody disputes
Advisory Committee Note. The qualifications enumerated in this rule are required for the performance of a custody
evaluation. However, if the qualifications are met, a practitioner from another state with a different title wiM not be barred
from performing a custody evaluation.
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To:
Judges, Commissioners, Attorneys, and Custody Evaljiators
From: Alicia Davis, Staff, Standing Committee on Children and Family Law
Date: March 31, 2003
Re:
New Custody Evaluation Procedures

I.

Introduction

Noting that custody evaluations are of varying quality, that high quality evaluations can be
costly, and that waiting for evaluations stalls the legal process, the Judicial Council charged the
Standing Committee on Children and Family Law to "improve the quality and timeliness of
custody evaluations." Having studied the issue in depth, the Standing Committee now presents
substantial revisions to Rule 4-903, "Custody Evaluations" of the Code of Judicial
Administration, as well as these accompanying forms. This memo explains the process
envisioned by the forms, and details the changes made to the rule^.
II.

Contemplated Custody Evaluation Process

Custody Evaluation forms have been approved by the Supreme Court and Judicial Council to
reduce the need for extensive, formally-prepared evaluations, and to make custody
considerations more accessible to the commissioner or judge on the bench. Any custody
evaluation submitted to the court must address the topics noted on these forms.
The settlement conference procedure is designed to (1) reduce the time and expense of
preparing a written report in cases where this might not be needed, (2) disclose the custody
evaluation findings in such a way that is less adversarial and less damaging to family
relationships, and (3) allow the parties a final opportunity to participate in the fashioning of an
agreement. It allows the parties to benefit from the insights of the evaluator while still
experiencing a sense of control over the decisions made about their children. Through greater
participation of the parties, it is hoped that future conflict will be reduced. If no settlement is
reached at or soon after this conference, a written evaluation would be prepared and a court date
set. The "Settlement Conference Report" form sets forth the topics to be addressed at the
settlement conference. Toward the end of the settlement conference, and depending on the
wishes of the commissioner or judge, the evaluator may issue verbkl custody recommendations.
The "Table of Contents" form is to be used if a formal, written custody evaluation is requested
by the parties. It has been designed to allow the judge or commissioner to refer to pertinent
The mission of the Utah judiciary is to provide the people an open, fair,
Efficient, and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law.
450 South State Street / P O Box 140241 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 / 801-578-3929 / Fax 801-578-3843 / email aliaad@email utcourts gov

information quickly while on the bench. It also serves as a guide to evaluators and ensures that
the written evaluation includes all of the information listed on the forms.
Available at www.utcourts.gov/resources/forms, both forms can be downloaded, and expanded at
the evaluator's preference.
The custody evaluation procedure shall be as follows:
1. Evaluator receives the court order of appointment from one or the attorneys and is notified of
the web site where the new rules, forms, and custody evaluation procedure can be
downloaded.
2. Evaluator commences and completes information-gathering component of the evaluation and
notifies the parties or their counsel within five business days of completion of the
information-gathering process.
3. Counsel arranges a Settlement Conference including the| commissioner or judge, the
evaluator, all counsel (including the GAL), and the parties (except children) within 45 days
of notice from the evaluator that the information-gathering is complete.
4. The evaluator completes the identifying information on the "Settlement Conference Report"
and makes written notations of topics to be covered verbally concerning "Summary of
Children's Needs" and "Summary of Each Parent's and Stepparent's Ability and Propensity
to Provide for these Children's Needs." The evaluator does not enter notations for "Rule 4903 Considerations" or "Legal and Physical Custody Recommendations," but should be
prepared to verbally present his/her conclusions. The commissioner or judge will determine
if custody recommendations will be issued.
5. During the Settlement Conference, the Commissioner/Judge advises the parties of the process
and lets the evaluator know if custody recommendations are to be presented. The evaluator
distributes copies of the partially-completed "Settlement Conference Report" for further
individual note-taking. After the evaluator presents his/her findings, the counsel and parties
determine if settlement is possible, either at that time or after further negotiation. At the
conclusion of the meeting, the Commissioner/Judge (a) issues restrictions on what the
children are told about the findings and by whom, and (b) restricts distribution of the
"Settlement Conference Report" and asks the parties' counsel tp retain their clients' copies.
6. Evaluator receives, preferably within 10 days after the conference, (a) a request from any
counsel/party in the case that a written report is necessary or (b) notice from counsel that a
settlement has been reached and the evaluation case can be closed. If a report is necessary,
any additional retainer needed is collected from the parties iij the same proportion stated in
the order. The evaluator completes the report and completes the "Table of Contents", which
is placed on top of the report and forwarded to the court and to all counsel. If no report is
needed, any retainer held for the writing of the report is returned to the parties and the case is
closed.
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III.

Amended Rule 4-903

Effective April 1, 2003, Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903 has been amended to
provide 1) who is competent to perform custody evaluations, 2) inclusions on motions or
stipulations for the performance of custody evaluations, and 3) expanded consideration in cases
in which special concerns are at issue, like domestic violence, or psychological testing.
Changes to Rule 4-903 require social workers to have a master's degree in social work and be
licensed as a 'Licensed Clinical Social Worker' (LSCW) to perform custody evaluations. Social
workers with lesser degrees are not qualified. 'Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists'
(LMFT) are included in Rule 4-903 as those professionals qualified to perform custody
evaluations. The qualifications enumerated in this rule are required for the performance of a
custody evaluation. However, if the qualifications are met, a practitioner from another state with
a different title will not be barred from performing a custody evaluation. In cases in which two
evaluators are appointed, one in Utah and the other out-of-state, the out-of-state evaluator will be
expected to meet the same criteria as the evaluator who is licensed in Utah.
To assure timely submission of evaluations, 4-903 now requires that the evaluation state the
"anticipated dates of commencement and completion of the evaluation and the estimated cost of
the evaluation." This information, as well as assignment of cost, will be included in the court's
order for the evaluation. Including the completion date in the order will require greater
timeliness from the parties.
The order shall also set forth "special" factors requiring evaluation, such as domestic violence,
substance abuse, sexual abuse or mental illness. The subcommittee considered actual examples
in which an evaluator's lack of experience or expertise in a particular area prevented the
evaluator from assessing the risk inherent in a particular family dynamic. The amendment also
recognizes that psychological testing should be dispositive in an evaluation, but should be
considered within the context of all of the available data, and should take into account the
inherent stresses associated with divorce and custody disputes. The amended rule can be found
atwww.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucia/index.htm.
These procedures have been considered carefully by the Standing Committee on Children and
Family Law, and by the Judicial Council and Supreme Court. By addressing minimum
qualifications, deadlines for completion, and addressing the special considerations of particular
cases, the amendments intend to address concerns expressed with the current processes, and to
alleviate those concerns.
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Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction'/' , ^ f •" 1 Case
r- r-, _c ^ _,
Ex Parte Order

Numbe

t

; ^S^*
Court: U T
\V A ^ •'-'"•'•.^y
J , ^ - / County:
^
, —

,State; Utah

wuifeiir j ^ : _. ^ r-

Petitioner (protected person):

HtWKJiC

VK^wr

Ihoiv^S

Other people protected by this order:
Relationship
A/ame
/\ge
to Petitioner

Last

Middle

F/ref

Address and phone # (to keep private, leave blank):
Street

SM-T Wr Urt
City

QT 64ft05
State

Zip

Phone #:
Petitioner's attorney (if any):
Phone #

Name

Describe Respondent:

Respondent (person Petitioner is protected from):

Sex
Middle

Other names used;
Address: S l c l l u 3
v

SfreeJ

Eyes

UlftorO

'\L
1

C/fy

fi/loo^
State

Warning!

Date of Birth i Ht, .
Wt
2.Z
Social Security #
(only the iast 4 numbers.

at

Last

OT

Race

2p

mo 5u>r"~Tb3"

jWh: ^wJl")" 6\fc-"74-S&l

Distinguishing features (like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.):
Driver's license issued by (State): \J~X ExpiresBest timaand place to find Respondent:
(Time) oH-g^ / l D o (Place)- ^ ' * ~ e -

^21 Weapon Involved

-?

:,^U^e6 3

Findrngs: The court has reviewed the Petitioner's Request for Stalking Injunction, finds there is reason to
believe it has jurisdiction over the parties and this case, that stalking has occurred, and that the Respondent is the
stalker. The Respondent has the right to a hearing, if he or she asks for it.
(Utah Code §77-3o-J06.5, §77-3a-WL)

rders the Respondent to obey all orders initialed on this form,
must not contact or stalk the Petitioner.

This order ends 3 years
after it is served.

gs to the Respondent:

^~~

• Attention: This is an official court order. No one except the court can change it. If you disobey this order, the court
may find you in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime
you may have committed in disobeying this order
• If you do not agree with this order, you can ask for a hearing to tell your side. Your request must be in writing, and
must be filed at the court listed below within 10 days of the date you were served with this order. If you do not ask
for a hearing within 10 days, this order will last for 3 years after it is served You can still ask for a hearing after 10
days, but then you must persuade the court the injunction is not needed.
^

• Court address to ask for a hearing:

^

Ovyraci

(ov^T

\2£

>0

lOpW

i^NlQ

S4(?0 \

• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this stalking injunction is in effect
Violence Agamsi Women Act of J 994 18 U.S C §§ 2265. 2262, J8 L.S C $ 922(g)(8)
Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction
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T o : (Respondent's name):

f\

A

'~A g - l O g T

CQ^bCKJ

^ — ^ ^ M

HE

Obey all orders initialed by the judge.
Violation of these orders is a criminal Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by ufl to one year in jail and a fine. A second or
suJ>^i^Q^v4o4atj[on can result in more severe penalties.
1 Personal Conduct Order
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to
the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-106.5 and 77-3a-101.
Nq^dontact Order
Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any w$y with the Petitioner and any person
listed below, either directly or indirectly.
Othew>eople you must not contact:

3 ^ g W } - S t a y Xway Order
^^
_Stay away from*

M

H u

b \ t > ^ ? 0 Crvh O \Ua^- voa^g

r^^A^Jr^-tJ^^

^

D a. The Petitioner's current or future: Hvehicle EJJob | W School Bnome,, premises
premises and
property (list current addresses below):
.
r^
Home address: 1&&5E*
UA&AJ/V^Q
lf\>C Jfe^i
W 0 * address: \.\t>T\*Q ^rfLD LO ^ f e i l A U ^ p , O T
e^Qt)3
7
School address:
^ K> \» g g - ^ T S
Q ^ vJ>T&V-\
Describe vehicle: A) Z O Q 3 N ' O P a S S ^ (]CJU>> ix_) (K) V ^ ~ 8 D ^ W
D b. Other (specify):

JT Orders (listbelow):

Date:/ 1l7_\]C "T"
U

"Do t-otrr KTTgKA^ -To

Time/^1? ' D m 0-fnrT

Judge's "Name:

•

Ca^^<^\

,

\jLUe>^)/

u=te^,

Q\6?kQA6C

UJA-^O

IDS.

0^4

Ub-4i

&£,

KVS^ONJ

e,e_ o-rWeB-f*

Judge'^Signature- - -T

Disability Accommodations and Interpreter Services
Assistive listening systems, sign language and oral language interpreter services are available at no charge in stalking
proceedings. Contact the clerk's office at least 5 days before your hearing.
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I
Temporary Civil Stalking I n j u n c t i o n / ^ '*
l &Ss>ir

Ex Parte Order

Case

Number

-Court: L T

v

fwax*

i »^KJir

1 *V
O ^ T ^ C T

^ ^ ^ j ,

:

•*<* fiz. " - V County:

Qtmri

W£Lr

B o <v\A^>
Last

Middle

F/rtrf

Address and phone # (to keep private, leave blank):
Street
set

State: Utah
i^-rt
;GMFLE7E£

Petitioner (protected person):

K

'
JUOICA»H-

Other peopl^ protected by this order;
Relationship
Nam$
Age
to Petitioner

^

City

State

Phone #•

fioi

Zip

761. &58i

Petitioner's attorney (if any): _
Name

Phone#

Describe Respondent:

Respondent (person Petitioner is protected from):

St; ^ M O C

Date of Birth

VbfiFWuo I S ^ & f x ^ o
Middle

Other names used;.
Address- S l ^ l t O

Social Security #
fon/y thpast 4 numbers)

lUfr&rO

OT

c«y

^l^Vx

Distinguishing features (like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.):

A40O-S
State

Wt

5L2-

Last

Street

^ K A M O

Ht

-^7

Zip

Driver's license ssued by (State)' \J"X

Expires:

Best time\and place to find Respondent:
(Time) girfe^ Cpo
\L0° (Place).
(Place). K ^ - X L .

Warning!1/ US Weapon Involved

. j
ciP<M^6J>

Findings: The court has reviewed the Petitioner's Request for Stalking Injunction, finds there is reason to
believe it has jurisdiction over the parties and this case, that stalking has opcurred, and that the Respondent is the
stalker. The Respondent has the right to a hearing, if he or she asks for it.
(Utah Code §77-3a-106.5t §77-3a-101)

ZSHJfbprders the Respondent to obey ail orders initialed on this form.
You must not contact or stalk the Petitioner.

This order ends 3 years
after it is served.

fgs to the Respondent:

~

• Attention: This is an official court order. No one except the court can change it. If you disobey this order, the court
may find you in contempt You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime
you may have committed in disobeying this order
• If you do not agree with this order, you can ask for a hearing to tell your side. Your request must be in writing, and
must be filed at the court listed below within 10 days of the date you were served with this order, If you do not ask
for a hearing within 10 days, this order will last for 3 years after it is served!. You can still ask for a hearing after 10
days, but then you must persuade the court the injunction is not needed.
• Court address to ask for a hearing: ^^V D v y r a c / i Q X A ^ T
^ S >Q i Q p W
V^Q^O S^GO
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this stalking injunction is nj effect.
Violence Against Women Act of J 994, 18 US C §§ 2265, 2262, 18USC
Temporary Civil Stalking injunction
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\

f

To: (Respondent's name):

—-^

H ^ W s E "

FFfiTiAQ

^OP&SetQ

Obey all orders initialed by the judge.
fi1
:
"•'-'^
'— is
•'- a—crimi
-~inal Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or
Violation of• these
orders
ion can result in more severe penalties.
^reona! Conduct Order
.Jo not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to
the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-106.5 and 77-3a-I01.
2
"

1/

\^]/\A
C/

N O contact Order
uo not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the Petitioner and any person
listed below, either directly or indirectly.
Othewpeople you must not contact:

M u ^ KD\$*nffn <yy- p \\^u^

voaj^g
1-S 16

-Yl

^>S>S^*

//

» / \ ti .

-^

^^ .

J

T

1

r i l l

i l l

t>^uJh>^^S
^

—

I

.Slay-away from:
^
' ^ J J *
^ y , ^ ^
<_*_. W W d
< ^ ki5
D a The Petitioner's current or future: DsVehicle HJob HSchool B'ftome, premises and
property (list current addresses below):
Lo\(e. CV-e. r^T LX*^.
Home address: ! & & S g "
U ^ C - A j K p Q PWC
<a_c- eA*Ofc
VWoU^s Wo^voLTftig^ address: \,\C>1\»0 ^fi'Zi? U
V W V^iAO P, OT
B^Qt>3
C. -for*- " a " - * ^
School address:
O t^\v &2J>\TS O ^ O T f r U
Describe vehicle: /t) 2 E Q 3 ^ ^ foS£*rt ( > Q U I k . ) (%)
W S
(__S^4
D b. Other (specify):

_ ^Orders (List below):

Date: / 7 / ^ l f g j ^

_____J_£3________\

"Do

t-JCrr fc-TTtTNApT '

^^yS_U*.m.&f&T

\^^i>

r o

Q^?t\QJ^GC

)

/

o2L
r

U J ^ « ^

Qi^

H v S < ^

o-^mnL5

_ w ^

Disability Accommodations and Interpreter Services
Assistive listening systems, sign language and oral language interpreter services are available at no charge in stalking
proceedings. Contact the clerk's office at least 5 days before your hearing.
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Has the Respondent used weapons or been violent in the past? KJ Yes D No D Don't know
Is the Respondent a law enforcement officer, government investigator,
/
or licensed private investigator?
• Yes m No • Don't know
4

Describe the stalking below:
a.

When and where did the stalking events happen? (Attach additional pages if necessary.)
1rt stalking event:

CXA-J

Z

When:
Where:

I (hJ^>

fcJd 6 , \~DK\-h9

3t a l k i n g event:

.!>

When: J G J ^ A ' 2 £ P S
Where: M \ a ^ J - q GXJQT^CUCA

^

b. Who did you report the stalking to (if anyone)?

^

~ ^ w W &£>£ ^
^xJjLvCyU. , NJ Q

<^\\ c J d ^ • S^nzixcJ

c. List names of all people who witnessed the stalking:
p<? VAL&VWQ^

of

^

KA&S^ 6fl-^>^

YozS^^^

idi^Kp re3J?i. C J ^ ^

6 ^ W J o ^ ZCDZ
IJi^cW ^

IX? D & ^ b K c V M C A A ^ C X

?Q

d. List any evidence you have of the stalking, like transcripts, audiotape, police reports, photos, sworn statements
from witnesses (affidavits), etc. You must attach at least one of these to this form.

pcA^ce.

irccov^

4vc^

\cJfl-k> VXLLAJ, V J - ^ U

l ^ U Lt_

If
e. Describe what the stalker did and why it made you o y our family member feel emotionally distressed or afraid of
being physically harmed, and why it would have made a reasonable person feel emotionally distressed or afraid of
being physically harmed^
.
r

C o C f ,/T> ^ X j S *

H^~-Q^U^JU?
Q^^&

f.

3^0-t^Q

Qu*-S>>

^ >•

\1U>"CUL^V

Other facts: ~ A Z < L O ^ t \ ^ K A ^ f >
V*>
t^VOM ~ZDO S

uvj^^h^gJrgcA
/ Z

B

A^l

KjOr-fW

^^JL

K j O v ' "^yv^lc^A^

^y^
Z P O ^

pGFS.'SocJiai
S r ^ + ^

VAJj-^C^

i c ^ ^
6

^

^

"lAAy^sKojJrg^l
D ^ i P

^

7"

C * H * U2.

C/zec/: fere //"voi/ /?ee^ more space. Ask the clerk/or the "Describe Stalking" form Fill it out bind attach it to this form.
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Other Court Cases
a. Are there other Court orders to the Respondent about stalking? • Yes DNo
(If Yes, fill out below and attach a copy of the court order.)
b. Have you or the Respondent ever been involved in any other court case involving either of you?
fil Yes • No (If yes, list ALL court cases below):

^wora

CJUAU
»

Court Case #
(NOT the police
poll' report #)

County and State

Type of Case

1 OVcUry Gfrv^
5

Q"T 1 *><u&ui

'

i

Did the judge make
an order?
DNo
1 QKYOU
Br^ou IxKRe
GJ'Respondent I "@Yc
& 7 o u D^espondenT
es D No
! g y o u D Respondent!
D Yes D N o
Person involved

2-e5?OKJO?KJT
16 <^vi e y . - t + U £ f c M O O , ^ - ^ 4 ^ ^ } ^ T V A ^ D CMAUD &^T!O y
Please, Judge, I am asking you to:
~
Ef Make the orders I have checked below,
N ^ O O T^^r
I S M O t O ^ ^ o\d
6
7

[2 Personal Conduct
Order the Respondent not to stalk me.

.

^%

^

- r i w ^ .•

,~

I

o
(\

W No Contact
Order the Respondent not to contact, phone, mail, email, or communicate with me in any way, either directly or
indirectly, or any person listed below:
Other people the Respondent must not contact:
Name

Relationship to j
Petitioner

Address

%otlxJ BJ t \x& ~S i^-v^e
8

d

Stay Away
Oixier the Respondent to stay away
from:
•
.
m a. My current or future: H Vehicle 0 Job 69 School ETHomq, premises and property (My current
addresses are listed below):
«
Home address:

( V * i * o * i s Ufi^Wfgkaddress:

1\0T(KJ

Describe vehicle:

6 0 Z O v p

<rV\£>y\v-KtO ^ , 0 - r

2QP"5» \ J V J P ^ S ^ ^ T C U J U ^ C ^ -

84QQ7S

\^ciB CfccW. G v ^ i CgLv^jcx^

D b. Other (specify) *
9

H

Other Assistance Needed (List below any other orders needed /[? protect you and other protected people
listed on page 1 of this form):

vy$ \ KJY'(r3rn Gfcrn TX3-J-

~~\.

t^>\j^
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Request for Civil Stalking Injunction - Describe Stalking
(Use this sheet only if you need more space to describe the stalking. Attach this sheet to your Request for Civi!
Stalking Injunction)
4

Describe the stalking below:

mtfrewtfp1-

•6^-^tfG—£qr*p*so—k
e-^—tttf

-&tto

fvfeuse-

(-^\^{eA^

V^fe-^t—-KKJQ

-mvr-

-r\WLtKi^

^^torfcr

VS'^CIDUDG^V-

-Hrf-WIT 6 t m V £ ( r D ACT

TXte H'MviDS o ^ — M H L - ^ J M F ^ S ^ ^ Q D
A-Ve TV\^^vrgK)fe?—--tipf^r

r^-^-tr^^r-

-feptrfefftfD

fe^-^tv^r^-

~\3PD

1^53?

TtttKife

L/JOULp ~~t£HX

fe,

rQEJftS^

^Nf^E—[^—(F r ^'4 It^^Luoi:
i:
^Kfe3—Bt
Describe Stalking form - Request for Civil Stalking injunction

\^t

Nv

ClMRtTTreTi^L-.
i «*w*<i

r,M

-tu

VIOLATION OF TEMPORARY CIVIL STALKIN0 INJUNCTION
Case Number: Utah Case # 060403495
Reported by: Officer M. Kazinsky, Police Dept of Missoula, Montana, P070111-018
Petitioner: Minnie LaRue Thomas (formerly Minnie LaRue Thorrias Jacobsen)
Respondent: Arne John Jacobsen
TIMELINE OF COURT ACTION AND VIOLATIONS:

DATE

COURT ACTION / VIOLATIONS

December 2006

LaRue seeks assistance and protection from th^ Utah courts through the UT
Legal Aid in Salt Lake City. Because much of the stalking and harassment
occurred in Provo and other states, they advise I her to seek a protective order in
the 4th District.
LaRue follows the advice of legal aid in SLC. On December 21 st , Judge
Stephen Hansen signed a Temporary Civil Staljking Injunction through the Utah
4th Judicial District Court in Provo, Utah. (Cas^ # 060403495)

12/21/2006

The Court Order stipulates that Arne John Jacobsen MUST:
1. NOT follow, threaten, ANNOY, HARASS, or cause DISTRESS to
LaRue
2. NOT contact, phone, mail, email, or cor^imunicate in any way with
LaRue
3. STAY AWAY from LaRue's home, vehicle, job, and school
4. NOT ATTEMPT TO DISPARAGE OR DISCREDIT LARUE to her
LDS Bishop, home teacher, the children!9 s teachers, or others (eg. cub
scout leaders) ward mission leader, or QTHERS in LaRue's and the
children fs lives {italics added)
01/03/2007

01/04/2007

Utah County (4th District) Sheriffs Deputy Da\je Sheen served the Stalking
Injunction to Arne John Jacobsen at approximately 8:30 am, after repeated
attempts over the holidays. Deputy Sheen calls ^aRue to confirm the Stalking
Injunction has been served. LaRue feels threatened because Arne and LaRue
have a court hearing in Missoula, Montana on January 4th, and Arne has
harassed LaRue before and after previous hearings or court-ordered meetings.
VIOLATION: On January 4,2007, after a court hearing at the Missoula
County Courthouse, and after Judge Larson had left the courtroom, Arne
became angry, annoyed, harassed, and caused distress to LaRue. Arne
disparaged and discredited LaRue by attacking LaRue's personality, mental
stability, and mothering skills. Several people witnessed Ame Jacobsen's verbal
attack of LaRue.

